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Wiretapping’s Fruits, the First Amendment, and the Paradigms of Privacy
by Bernard W. Bell
The Supreme Court’s, and the legal system’s, treatment of privacy can profitably be
explored in terms of five paradigms. These paradigms focus on physical location, the means of
communication, the means of intrusion, subject matter, and confidential relationships. The
reliance on some, but not others in particular contexts serves to determine the results that the
Court reaches (or that statutes ordain), and the Court has systematically favored particular
paradigms in ways that often make privacy protections porous.
After setting forth the five privacy paradigms, I will examine the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper.1 There the Court addressed the constitutional validity of statutes
barring individuals who receive information derived from illegal wiretaps from disclosing that
information. The Court took a law premised on one privacy paradigm, namely the means of
communication paradigm, and introduced a test premised upon a competing paradigm, the
subject matter paradigm. Privacy was defined not in terms of the “private” nature of the means
of communication employed, but in terms of the “public” nature of the matters discussed. The
choice the Court made between the two warring paradigms, one embodied in the wiretapping
statutes and the other embodied in the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, was significant in
itself. In addition, the pre-eminence given to the subject matter analysis by Bartnicki v. Vopper
threatens to remove any real constraint on use of information obtained from those who illegally
intercept conversations, because of the limited conception of “private” matters in the Court’s
First Amendment doctrine. However, an alternative approach to distinguishing “public” and
“private” matters offers more protection for those engaged in communications intercepted by
miscreants and delivered to the press.

1

532 U.S. 514, 542-43 (2001)
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I. The Paradigms of Privacy
The myriad federal, state, and local laws that protect “privacy” do not reflect any
comprehensive definition of the concept. Instead they incorporate a variety of more limited
privacy paradigms, each of which offers some protection based upon incomplete definitions of
privacy. Each paradigm ultimately misses important aspects of our conception of privacy.
Moreover, these paradigms differ radically and can often suggest conflicting resolutions of
privacy questions. Courts or legislatures may tend to prefer some of the paradigms to others,
with significant doctrinal consequences. The paradigms most useful in analyzing privacy law are
those of: (1) location, (2) means of communication, (3) means of intrusion, (4) subject matter,
and (5) confidential relationships. I will address each in turn.

A. The Location Paradigm

The legal system sometimes defines the entitlement to privacy in terms of the location of
an individual or a prospective intruder. Thus, a couple’s argument may be viewed as private if it
occurs in an area from which others are excluded, but may be viewed as public if it takes place
on a public sidewalk. In some senses then, people can determine whether particular matters are
“private” or “public” by deciding where to locate themselves when engaging in certain activities.2
Thus, the first of the five privacy paradigms I will explore is the paradigm of location.
This paradigm has dominated the Supreme Court’s conception of privacy in a number of
respects. Location may help define privacy in two ways. First, the Court, and the legal system
more generally, may enable citizens to limit others’ access to them or protect certain personal
information by allowing the individual to exclude potential intruders from a particular physical
space. Thus, the legal system might focus on defining “private” and “public” spaces based on
legal and social norms. It may then protect privacy by precluding individuals from intruding into

2

See, e.g., HA NN AH AREN DT , TH E H UM AN CO ND ITION 38-7 8 (1958 ) ("T he only efficient way to
guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned
place to hide in.").
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private spaces without substantial justification. Conversely, when an individual conducts his or
her activities in a public place, the legal system may deem those activities “public” in the sense
that those who view and discuss those activities breach no legally-recognized privacy interest.
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence heavily focuses on the location
paradigm; it protects privacy largely by protecting private property.3 The Court’s definition of
the “expectations of privacy” whose breach must be justified by probable cause, a warrant, or the
equivalent (i.e., some exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements) relies heavily on
location.4 For example, garage, store, and commercial warehouse interiors not visible from
outside are considered locations in which their owners have a reasonable expectation of privacy
(even though the activities that routinely take place on such premises might not be considered
“private” in and of themselves). But that expectation of privacy exists solely because of the
areas’ inaccessibility to the public.5 A location can also be defined in terms of personal property;
thus a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a suitcase, so long
as others cannot perceive the contents of the suitcase without opening it.6
More controversially, some matters are deemed public because they take place in
locations the Court defines as public. For example, homeowners have no expectation of privacy
in trash left in opaque bags at street curbs for collection by sanitation workers. The Court viewed
such bags, and their contents, as “public” because any member of the public can take physical

3

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U .S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[O ]ur Fourth Amendment jurispru dence was tied to
commo n-law trespass.").
4

Fourth Amendment analysis involves a two-step process. First, a court must determine whether law
enforcem ent officers have breached a ny reasonab le expectation o f privacy — in other word s, the court must
determine whether the investigative target has any cognizable privacy interest at all. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). If the court concludes that the target did possess a legitimate expectation
of privacy, the court must then decide whether the Fourth Amendment permits the breach of that privacy expectation
— either because the police have secured a warrant after establishing probable cause, or because the bre ach fits
within on e of numero us judicially-reco gnized exceptions to the warrant and p robable cause re quirements. Id. at 367.
5

Taylor v. U.S., 286 U.S. 1, __ (193 2)(garage); Amos v. U.S., 255 U.S. 313 , ___ (1921 )(store); See v.
City of Seattle, 38 7 U .S. 541, __ _ (1967 )(ware house); W AYNE R. L A F AVE ET AL., C RIM INAL P ROCEDURE § 3.2(a)
(3d ed. 2000 ).
6

See U.S. v. Jacobson, 466 U .S. 109, 123-24 (19 84)(distinguishing opening suitcase without a warrant
from having a trained dog sniff the suitcase from outside to determine the presence of contraband narcotics). See
pages __-__ infra (discussing the human body as a protected “location”).
-3-
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possession of the bag and rummage through it.7 The homeowner, then, relinquishes any right to
privacy in the information contained in such refuse, no matter how sensitive in terms of subject
matter,8 by taking the bag from a private place and leaving it in a public one.9 Similarly,
homeowners have no expectation of privacy in fenced-in back yards obscured from public view
at street level. The yards are visible from publicly accessible space, namely airspace controlled
by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), and thus law enforcement officers can use
satellites, airplanes, or hovering helicopters to view and photograph such enclosed areas.10
The treatment of electronic tracking devices (like beepers or global positioning system
(“GPS”) monitoring devices), provides a third example of the Court’s approach. Law
enforcement officers may place such devices on items in an individual’s possession and monitor
the device as long as the item to which the device is attached remains in a public place.11
However, once the device reveals information about events in a private location, even trivial
information such as opening a container of drug precursors, such monitoring violates an
expectation of privacy. 12

7

See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,. For a contrasting approach, see State v. Hemp ele, 120 N.J.
182 (19 90)(search of opaque garbage b ags without warrant or reliance on an exception to the warrant requirement
violated the New Jersey Constitution).
8

In fact, some courts have noted that residential refuse often contains information that we consider very
private. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 201, 576 A.2d 793 (1990); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 662, 701 P.2d
1272 (1 985).
9

Greenwood illustrates another aspect of the Courts doctrine, namely that the Court independently defines
expectations of privacy rather than incorporating legal entitlements established by statutes, regulations, or common
law. Thus, in Greenwood, the Court accorded no significance to a local regulation prohibiting individuals from
rumm aging through other’s garbage. 486 U .S. 43 -44. (A rguab ly, however, such regulations which are typical in
many areas, were initially enacted mo re out of a concern for public health than p rivacy. State v. Hemp ele, 120 N.J. at
808. The Court’s approach contrasts to its approach in determining which rights constitute “property” for purposes
of the Due Process Clause. See Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 498 U .S. 564, 577 (197 2).
10

See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986); Dow
chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANN E T. MCKENNA,
W IRE TA PP ING AN D E AV ESDR OP PIN G § 29:1 6 (2d ed. 1995).
11

United States v. Knotts, 46 0 U .S. 27 6, 28 1-83 (1983) (treating surveillance of a vehicle via a sec retly
planted transmitter as the equivalent of surveillance by actual people along the vehicle's route). For a contrasting
view, see State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 21 7 (W ash. S. Ct. 2003).
12

United States v. Karo, 4 68 U .S. 70 5 (1984 ).
-4-
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Note that in the Court’s application of its location analysis, the location of the intruder,
not of his or her subject, is critical. Thus, if the intruder is normally in a location considered
private, in terms of an ability to preclude unwanted guests from entering, that person nevertheless
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy if he or she is visible from a public location (i.e., a
location accessible to others or the general public). For example, if a homeowner stands in front
of an open window visible from the street dressed only in underwear, he or she has no
expectation of privacy.
This approach has largely been adopted with regard to non-governmental intruders as
well, though the Supreme Court’s role in crafting legal doctrines in this context has been quite
modest. The common law tort action for intrusion into seclusion reflects a narrow location based
approach.13 Thus, for instance, when journalists or private snoops breach private property, they
will generally be held to have invaded the property owner’s privacy.14 When, however, an
individual is either in a public place or observable from one, courts have generally held that he
or she can assert no right of privacy.15 Indeed, even when the information is not gained by
13

R ESTATEMENT S ECON D O F T ORTS § 652B . While locational concepts are central in the text of the
Restatement provisions (e.g., “seclusio n” and “solitude”), the privac y vindicated b y the cause of action is not solely
defined in terms of locations. In particular, the tort may result from intrusion into “private affairs or concerns.” For
a critique of the e mph asis plac ed up on location in intrusion cases, se e Ro bert C . Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy : Com munity and Self in the Co mm on La w To rt, 77 CAL IF . L. R EV . 957, ___ (1989)(“The privacy protected
by the comm on law tort cannot be reduced to ob jective facts like spatial distance or information o r observability; it
can only be understood by reference to norms of behavior.”)
14

Miller v. Nat'l Broad . Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 66 8, 67 7-78 , 684 -85 (Cal. Ct. A pp . 198 6) (allo wing plaintiff's
claim against a television crew w ho entered her ho me without permission to film emergency perso nnel attempting to
revive her husband); see W ilson v. Layne, 526 U .S. 60 3 (1999 )(hold ing that police with warrants may not invite
third parties into searched premises).
The intrusion into seclusion cause of action may offer limited privacy protection because private areas may
be somewhat accessible to people who remain in public areas and use their natural or mechanically enhanced powers
of ob servation.
15
See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 , 490-92 (Cal. 1998) ("T he tort [of intrusion]
is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place ...."); see
also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bob by Berosini, Ltd., 895 P .2d 1269 , 1280-81 & n.20 (Nev.
199 5); Andrew Jay M cClurg, Bringing Priva cy La w O ut of the Clo set: A T ort Th eory of Liability for In trusion s in
Public Places, 73 N.C. L. R EV . 989 , 103 6-41 (1995). See genera lly C. T HOM AS D IENES ET A L ., N E W S GA T H ER IN G
AND THE L AW §§ 12-2, 12-4(c)(2) (2d ed . 1997).
Thus, the location-focused quality of common-law intrusion claims makes extremely difficult successful
assertion of a privacy cause of action against extensive and intrusive monitoring that occurs in public places. See
Bernard W . Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, And Privacy, 11 W M . &
M A R Y B ILL R TS . J. 151, ___ n.72 (20 02).
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observation from a public place, the fact that it could be so garnered is sufficient for the
information to be considered “public.” Note that the Supreme Court’s expectation of privacy
focuses on whether information is exposed to public view, not whether the information is gained
from public view.16 So, for example, one’s address is not private because it is exposed to the
public, even if a person discovers one’s address by some other means.17 A more privacyprotective location approach might reject such an approach.18
Location-based privacy approaches defining the scope of privacy need not exclusively
turn on real property interests.19 We may consider certain physical spaces as “private” ones in
which occupants have some “expectation of privacy” even though they lack any ownership
interest. For example, use of hidden cameras in public bathroom stalls constitutes a search
requiring probable cause and a warrant (or the equivalent) because users of such facilities possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stall while they occupy it, despite their lack of any real
property claim to dominion over the stall.20
16

Katz v. U nited States, 389 U.S. 347 , 351 (1967) ("W hat a person know ingly exposes to the public, even
in his own hom e or o ffice, is not a su bjec t of Fourth Amendme nt protection").
17

See, Re msbe rg v. Doc usearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 10 01 14 9 N .H . 148 (200 3) (holding that where a person 's
work address is readily observable by members of the public, the address cannot be private and no intrusion upon
seclusion action can be maintained, even if the intruder obtains the information from the plaintiff by deceit rather
than by obse rving he r in pub lic places). See gene rally, W . P AGE K EETON ET AL., P R O S SE R AN D K EETON ON THE L AW
OF T ORTS § 11 7, at 85 5 (5th ed.1 984 ); Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 So.2 d 31 6, 31 9 (La . Ct. Ap p.19 79). Note
that in interpreting the privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated
addresses as private, but largely because it would enable intrusions, in the form of mass mailings, by mass marketers
or lab or organizers. United S tates D epartment of De fense v. F .L.R.A ., 510 U.S. 487 (1994); see, Wine Hobby USA,
Inc. v. United States I.R.S., 502 F.2d 133 (3d C ir. 1974).
18

For example, while the United States Supreme Co urt held that the use of a beeper to track the
mov ements of a ca r did not violate reaso nable expectations of privacy, b ecause law enforcement officers could
lawfully follow the car to obtain the same information, the Washington Supreme Co urt prohibited the practice. The
Court explained that even though it might theoretically possible to maintain such surveillance, the beeper (or, more
specifically, the GPS tracking device), served as substitute for such dem anding and labor-intensive surveillance.
State v. Jackson, 150 W ash.2d 25 1, 26 2, 76 P.3d 21 7 (2003 ).
19

See O liver v. U nited S tates, 46 6 U .S. 17 0, 18 3-84 & n.1 5 (1984 )(law enforcement officers may co mmit
the tort of trespass by entering privately-owned open fields without violating the landowner’s reasonable expectation
of privacy).
20

See, e.g., Peo ple v. D ezek, 308 N.W .2d 6 52, 6 55 (Mich. Ct. A pp. 1 981 ) (reco gnizing privac y interest in
rest stop stalls during periods of occupation); State v. Casconi, 766 P.2d 397, 399 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) ("'The final
bastion of privacy is to be found in the area of human procreation and excretion' and '[if] a person was entitled to any
shred of privacy, then it is to privacy in these matters."') (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
-6-
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Perhaps more controversially, we may have a small area around us that social custom
defines as ours, and that we may ask others to keep inviolate.21 Thus, by custom, we may view
people as intruding when they stand too close in certain situations.22 Perhaps such an insight
would provide a different perspective on certain privacy issues even under a location based
approach.
Under the standard property-based location approach, law enforcement officers'
surreptitious use of facial recognition technology on streets and in sports stadiums raises no
privacy interest, because anyone scanned in such a place is publicly visible.23 But that conclusion
seems counter-intuitive to many. (The conclusion is not necessarily counter-intuitive because
such an intrusion should be considered unjustified, but only because the conventional analysis
suggests the absence of any “intrusion” that even demands justification.) At least prior to
September 11, 2001, a chorus of criticism greeted the use of video monitors and facial
recognition technology to identify people on public streets.24
We might understand the opposition to such surveillance if we focus on the “means on
intrusion” paradigm (as I will suggest below).25 But a sophisticated “location” analysis might
also explain the problematic nature of such surveillance techniques — such techniques invade
individuals’ “space.” A camera operator using zoom technology could focus on details
observable by the naked eye only if the observer were staring intently at a person from inches
away. The camera operator might obtain information that could be gained only by breaching the

(decided under O regon state constitution).
21

See genera lly Rob ert C. P ost, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. R EV . 957, 971 -74 (1989) (discussing the role of the social construct of private space in shaping
intrusion law).
22

E RVING G OFFMAN , R E LA T IO N S

23

See D ana C aned y, Tam pa S can s the F aces in Its Crowd for C riminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A1.

IN

P U BLIC 29-32 (197 1).

24

Ross Kerber, Technolog y & Innovation: F ace-R ecognition So ftware Sp urs Privacy Fea rs, BOSTON
GL OB E, Aug. 20 , 200 1, at C1; M iki Meek, You Can't Hide Those Lying Eyes in Tampa: Street Cameras Spark a
Priva cy D eba te, U.S. NE W S & W OR LD REP., Aug, 6, 2001 , at 20; R ick M ontgo mery, Face-Recognition Softwa re
Getting a Hard Look Since Sept. 11, KA NS AS C ITY STA R, N ov. 25 20 01, at A1; R obe rt O'Harrow Jr., Matching
Faces With Mug Shots; Software for Police, Others Stirs Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1.
25

See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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social recognized “space” individuals are entitled to as the move through public areas.26
A location-driven analysis has also strongly influenced the courts’, and the legal system’s,
analysis of privacy rights conventionally considered autonomy rights.27 The legal system may
sometimes characterize conduct as public or private depending on the nature of the location in
which that conduct occurs. Sometimes non-commercial conduct will more likely be considered

26

The same is true with regard to viewing a person in their front yard with binoculars, which under the
Court’s analysis surely violates no reasonable expectation of privacy, see U.S. v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (19 27)(dicta);
On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 , 754 (1952)(dicta); FISH MAN & M CK EN NA , supra note 10, § 29:10; Christopher
Slob ogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 M IN N . L. R EV . 1393 nn. 43-44 (20 02), but which many see as much more intrusive
than some law enforc ement action s the Co urt has recognized as violating a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Christo pher Slob ogin & Joseph E . Schumacher, Rea sonable Exp ectatio ns of P rivacy and Auton om y in F ourth
Am end ment Ca ses: An Emp irical Lo ok at "Unde rstanding s Rec ogn ized and P ermitted by Society, 42 DUK E L.J.
727, 763 (1993)(chart).
A well-known case, Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 76 5 (N.Y. 19 70),
provides an example of judicial recognition of our intuition that individuals have a “private” space around them as
they navigate the world. The case involved wide-ranging allegations that General Motors had harassed consumer
advocate Ralph Nader. Nader alleged that General Motors "hired people to shadow [him] and keep him under
surveillance." One of Nader’s complaints has particular relevance to the current discussion, namely his assertion that
his Ge neral M otors "shadow " followed him sufficiently closely to observe "the denomination of the bills he was
withdrawing from his account." Id. at 771. The co urt exp lained that
[a] person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by
being in a public place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give
anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing. On
the other hand, if plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal [the] facts to any
casual observer, then, it may no t be said that the ap pellant intruded into his
private sphere.
Id. Granted, the court phrased its analysis in terms of the subject matter to which intruders may direct their attention.
The passage ab ove suggests that information regarding the a mount a p erson withdraws from his bank account is a
private m atter. How ever, if the sub ject ma tter, withdrawal of mo ney from a bank, were truly the crux of the court's
analysis, a casual observer who could see the denominations of the currency Nader was withdrawing because of
Nader's carelessness in failing to keep the currency from sight could neither stare at Nader to discover the
denominations of the currency Nader held nor communicate information about Nader's withdrawal of money (even
that gained from casual observation. The Court probab ly did not intend to adopt such a position. Rather, the Court
can be viewed as adopting a sophisticated location-based analysis. The Co urt’s conclusion really embodies the
proposition that even in a public place we may have a small area around us that social custom defines as ours, and
that we may ask others to keep inviolate. Such personal space enables individuals to access purses or wallets that
contain personal, private matters without revealing those ma tters to others.
27

While subject to dispute among scholars, many view “privacy” as encompassing not only control of
information about or acc ess to p erson s but also the ability to engag e in conduc t free from the constraint of others, a
type of “liberty” interest. See Secrets & Lies n.21; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977)(“the cases
sometimes characterized as p rotecting privacy have in fact involved at least two different kind s of interests. One is
the individual interest in avoiding disclo sure of perso nal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions”).
-8-
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private, in the sense of being free from public control, simply because it takes place in certain
locations, most notably the home.28 Stanley v. Georgia29 provides the classic illustration. In
Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court precluded the government from enforcing laws
prohibiting possession of obscene material against a man who held such proscribed obscenity
within the confines of his home. The Court held that the government could generally prohibit
possession of obscene materials outside the home and could punish acquisition of such materials
— even if intended for use in the home — but could not prosecute the homeowner for possession
once he had brought the contraband inside his home.30 As the Court explained, "whatever may
be the justification for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's own home."31
As a second illustration of the relevance of location in defining spheres of autonomy,
consider two United States Supreme Court cases from the 1960's. In Robinson v. California,32
the Court found unconstitutional a California statute criminalizing narcotics addiction.
Admittedly, the Court did not establish a constitutional right to use narcotics at home. The
decision turned on the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution precluded the state from
criminalizing a “status” rather than “conduct.” However, in Powell v. Texas,33 the Court refused

28

However, when the conduct a resident engages in at home becomes commercialized, courts often
consider the conduct to have been transformed from "private" to "public." See, e.g., State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351,
1360 (1983) (holding that prostitution occurring within a private residence is not protected by Hawaii's constitutional
right of privacy). Com pare Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 49 4, 511 (Alaska 1 975 ), with Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206
(Alask a 1975) (com merc ial sale of narco tics to another in hom e not p rotected by the Alaska right of priva cy). See
gen erally, United States v. Le wis, 385 U .S. 206,2 13 (1966) (explaining that undercover o fficers’ entry into hom es,
by using dece ption to ob tain the ho meo wner's co nsent to enter, did not violate the homeowner's Fourth-Am endmentprotected expectation of privacy because the residence had become a locus of comm erce)("But when, as here, the
home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful
business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the
street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may
enter upon the pre mises for the very purp oses contem plated by the o ccup ant.")..
29

394 U .S. 557 (1969 ).

30

Id. at 568.

31

Id. at 565.

32

370 U .S. 660, 676- 77 (196 2).

33

392 U .S. 514, 532-37 (19 68).
-9-
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to extend Robinson to bar prosecution of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness. It pointedly
noted that Texas had not “attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in the privacy of his own
home.”34
Even the Court’s location analysis does not focus merely on physical accessibility.
Certain physical locations, like the home, receive special protection.35 The decision to accord
certain locations heightened protection often reflects a recognition that particular locations are
intimately associated with certain types of information or activities or with means of
communication (and thus reflect the influence of the subject matter and means of
communications paradigms in judicial consideration of a particular location’s status).
For instance, Anglo-Saxon tradition has long held the home as particularly sacrosanct,36

34
But see, Bowers v. H ardw ick, 47 8 U .S. 18 6, 19 5 (1986 ) ("P lainly eno ugh, otherwise illegal conduc t is
not immunized whenever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession or use of illegal drugs, do
not esc ape the law where they are comm itted at ho me."), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, — U .S. —, 123 S.Ct. 2472,
247 8 (2003 ) (hold ing that the right to privacy p rotects those who enter into homo sexual relationships and engage in
sexual intimacies, noting particularly that the conduct for which the parties were prosecuted occurred in the home,
and that the statutory prohibition included sexual cond uct “in the m ost private of places, the home”)..
The controversial Alaska Supreme Court decision in Ravin v. S tate, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), provides
a mo re striking exam ple of a judicial determination that o therwise illegal activity may be com e con stitutionally
protected private conduct because it occurs within the home. In Ravin, the court held that, even though the state may
prohibit possession and the purchase and sale of marijuana in general, the government may not prosecute an
individual for consuming m arijuana at ho me. Id. at 51 1. The court based its decisio n on the Alaska Constitutio n's
right of privacy clause, find ing that the clause protected consum ption of marijuana so long as it occurred in one's
hom e. Id. at 504.
This principle that conduct more easily qualifies as private if it occurs within the home may explain the
reaction, hyperbolically described as "global ridicule," to a Friendship Heights, Maryland ordinance banning
smoking at home if secondary smoke escapes the home and poses health risks to those outside. Jo Becker, Global
Ridicule E xtinguishe s Mo ntgo mery's An ti-Sm oking Bill, W ASH . PO ST , Nov. 28, 200 1, at A1; Jo Becker, Smokers
Told to Fetter Their Fumes, W ASH . PO ST , Nov. 21, 200 1, at A1.
35

Indeed, so metimes a “loc ation” is protected b ecause of the information it is likely to contain, and thus,in
a sense subject-matter concerns drive the location analysis. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rejection
of the Supreme Court’s decision that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque bags of garbage, was
based in part on the content of such bags, which often contain documents that say a lot about th individual who
discarded them. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, ___ (“[c]lues to people’s most private traits and affairs can be
found in their garbage”); accord, People v. Edwards, 71 C al.2d 1096, 110 4 (1969 ).
36

Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 H ARV . L. R EV . 1892, 1894 n.18 (1981);
Sem ayne’s C ase, 77 Eng. Re p. 19 4, 19 5 (K .B. 1604 ); W ILLIAM B L AC K ST O N E, 4 C OMM ENTARIES ON THE L A W S O F
E N G LA N D 223 (176 9).
-10-
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and the Supreme Court has largely honored that tradition.37 Indeed recently, in Kyllo v. United
States,38 the Court suggested that a more robust location analysis might apply to the home. In
holding that warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to identify a dwelling’s heat signature
(for purposes of determining whether the occupant was cultivating marijuana), the Court
recognized an expectation of privacy in an aspect of the home that could be detected from a
lawful vantage point. Thus the key aspect of the case was the location of the conduct (the growth
of marijuana), not the intruder.39
Not only has the Court accorded residences special consideration in the Fourth
Amendment context, it has done so in the First Amendment context as well. For example,
speakers ordinarily have a right to speak in public places even though their speech may disturb or
offend to others.40 Thus, in public, citizens must “avert their eyes” to avoid such disturbing or
offensive speech.41 However, when the speech enters the home, privacy interests ordinarily
prevail over the First Amendment interest of speakers.42 The home has also sometimes assumed
37

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a search warrant to support thermal
scanning of a home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (asserting that being arrested in your home
is such a substantial invasio n that a warrant is require d, unless there are exigent circumstances); N E LS O N L A S SO N ,
T HE H IS T O RY A N D D EVELOPMENT OF THE F O U R T H A MEND MENT TO THE U N IT E D S TATES C O N S TIT U TIO N 13-15
(1970). See generally, L A F AVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3.2(c); Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A M an's Hom e is his Castle?:”
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8
W M . & M A R Y J. W O M E N & L. 175, 175- 183 (2002).
38

533 U .S. 27, 40 (2001).

39

Granted the opinion may merely have been written in overly broad language, and the fact that thermal
imaging technology are not in general use may have been dispositive. Perhaps the Court was merely holding that
behaving in a w ay that exposes inform ation to users of therma l imaging devices d oes not qualify as exposing those
activities “to the public” because thermal imging devices are not in general public use.
40

See note 47 supra, and accompa nying text.

41
Thus nude scenes from a drive in movie theater are protected by the First Amendment. Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971)(First Amendment protected war
protester’s wearing a jacket saying “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse, despite the fact that others were offended).
42

Thus, the Fe deral Co mmunication Com mission can regulate the broad cast of indecent speech be cause
broadcasts “confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of his home, where the individual’s right
to be let alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment right of intruders.” FCC v.Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736
(1978). Similarly, states may ban targeted picketing of a particular residence. Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, ___
(1988)(“An impo rtant aspect of such privacy is the protection of unwilling listeners within their homes from the
intrusion of objectionable or unwanted speech.”). In Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the
Court upheld a Postal Service regulation permitting recipients of pandering advertisement to have the Postal Service
-11-
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importance in the Court’s definition of the scope of decisional autonomy protected by the
constitutional “right to privacy,” as we have seen above.43 Indeed, more broadly, tort law has
long recognized the home as special and thus moderated the standard duties that would require
homeowners to make their residences safe for visitors.44
By contrast, commercial premises are protected by a much less robust conception of
privacy.45 Indeed, the more modest expectations of privacy associated with commercial activity
may explain the more limited Fourth Amendment protection applicable in the regulatory
environment.46 However, even some commercial areas may receive special privacy protections,
in part perhaps because they serve as a locus for activities viewed as private under other privacy
paradigms — that is, they are the locus for confidential relationships (recognized under the
confidential relationships paradigm), a means of communication (recognized under the means of
communication paradigm), or certain “private” activities (as recognized under the subject matter
paradigm).

require the mailer to remove the addressee’s name from its mailing list. The Co urt acknowledged that outside our
homes, we are often captives who must listen to objectionable speech, but that we need not be captives within our
hom es. Id. at ___. See also M ainstram Marekting Services, Inc. v. FT C slip o p. at 19 -20 D kt No . 03-1 429 (10th
Cir. February 17, 2004)(upholding constitutionality of the national do not call registries).
43

See note ___ infra.

44

Thus, visitors to a commercial establishments' public areas and individuals invited onto premises for
commercial purposes qualify as "invitees" and have a right to expect landowners to exercise reasonable care.
R ESTATEMENT (S E C O N D) OF T ORTS § 332 (1977). Social guests to residences, however, must take the premises as
they find them, an d the host ordinarily must me rely disclose dangerous conditions. Id. at § 342. Granted, several
jurisdictions have jettisoned the rigidity of this traditional approach. Nevertheless, landowners' freedom to act on
their own property despite the risk of injury to those who come onto their land is unusually pronounced when the
property is a p rivate residence. Com pare id., with id. at § 33 2. Genera lly, the duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable
harm to othe rs is much greater than the duty the law imp oses o n landowners with regard to social visitors. Id. at §
342.
45

See Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 235-39, 237 n.4 (1986) (allowing aerial surveillance of
large industrial complex, but suggesting that the result would be different as to "an area immediately adjacent to a
private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened").
46

See R adhika Ra o, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. R EV . 359, 389, 436
(2000)(“relational privacy” provides little shelter for “commercial transactions”).
Administrative searches, however, are not invariably limited to b usinesse s. See C amara v. M unicipal Co urt,
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. State, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). (Border control searches often involve intrusions upon
individuals not engaged in commercial enterprises.) Nevertheless, administrative searches of non-commercial
premises are rare.
-12-
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Medical facilities may receive heightened privacy protections for such reasons,
particularly in the First Amendment context. Ordinarily, people in public places “must tolerate
insulting, even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate breathing space for the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment.”47 The Supreme Court has said, however, that people in
medical facilities, as well as those who enter and leave such facilities are entitled to special
protections from the tumult produced by confrontational speech.48 Thus, states possess enhanced
powers to restrict protests near health care facilities, including facilities providing abortion
services, to reduce the “potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests.”49
Similarly, book stores and public libraries (or at least the records they maintain) are accorded
heightened protection as locations, because they reveal much about the information a person
receives. As I shall suggest below, receipt of information in such a context is a form of
communication that, under the means of communication paradigm, may well warrant significant

47

Boos v. B arry, 48 5 U .S. 31 2, 32 2 (1988 ).

48

W hile ord inarily “in pu blic debate . . . citizens must tolerate insulting, even outrageous sp eech in order to
provide adequate breathing space for the freedoms protected by the First Amendment,” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
322 (19 88); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 309 (19 40)(citizens on street corners must, in the interest of fostering
“enlightened opinion,” tolerate sp eech that “tempt[s] [the listener] to throw [the speaker] off the street”), states, in
the exercise of their po lice po wers, m ay take fo cus particularly “on access to health care facilities” and seek to
prevent the “potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
715 (20 00); see Mad sen v. Wom en’s Health Center Inc., 512 U .S. 753, 772 (199 4)(upholding noise restrictions
around abortion clinics because noise control is particularly important around medical facilities during surgery and
recovery periods).
One striking case in which such a pe rspective may have mad e a difference is Howell v. New York P ost, 81
N.Y . 115 (1993). In that case a photojournalist seeking to photograph He dda Nussbaum on the grounds of a private
psychiatric hospital, the Four W inds Hospital, trespassed onto Four W inds’ grounds to photograph Nussbaum with a
telephoto lens. Had N ew York recognized an “intrusion into seclusion” cause of action, plaintiff, a patient who
happened to be near Nussbaum when the photo was taken, m ight have prevailed. Instead , the plaintiff had to seek to
make out a claim for intention al infliction o f emotional distress. Trespa ssing to take a photograph dep icting a private
perso n’s residence in a psychiatric facility might appear to qualify as “extreme and outrageous” cond uct that would
provide a basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the court used a location analysis
in assessing the severity of the privacy invasion. The Co urt noted that mere trespass was not sufficiently outrageous
to give rise to such a cause of action, and that the fact that plaintiff was photographed outdoors and from a distance
weakened her claim. Id. at 126.
49

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000); see Madsen v. Women’s Health Center Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
772 (1994); Anita A llen, Privacy in Hea lth Care, E NCY CLOPED IA OF B IOETHICS 2064-73 (1995)(“norms of quietude
surrounding hospitals reflects the sentiment that patients have heightened physical and psychological needs for
solitude and peace of mind”).
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privacy protection.50
Though I have tried to define location in terms of physical space that can be occupied, the
human body could be viewed as a “location” entitled to heightened protection. As Justice Mosk
observed, albeit in dissent, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California,51 society’s
recognition of individual’s legally protectible interest in his or her own body constitutes society’s
acknowledgment of “a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as a physical and
temporal expression of the unique human persona.”52 Thus, courts have been particularly
protective when government seek to effectuate a significant invasion of the human body. 53
Moreover, one common law privacy cause of action focuses specifically upon vindicating
people’s interest in preventing the public display of their physical likeness without their
consent.54 Even in the autonomy context, the right of privacy has been justified as essential to
allowing individuals to control their own bodies.55 Individual’s autonomy interests in their

50

Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of T hornton, 44 P.2d 10 44 (200 2); D avid S treitfeld & Ann G erhart, Privacy
Between the Covers: Stores Have their Defenders and Skeptics in their Bind Over Starr’s Subpoenas, W ASH . P OST
F01 (Ap ril 3, 1998); JEFFRE Y RO SEN , THE UN W ANT ED G AZE: T HE D EST RUC TIO N O F PRIV ACY IN
AM ER ICA 4, 8-9, 20, 36, 61 ,167 -68, 2 30 (2 001 )(critical o f subpoena); see note 68 infra (concerns about
accessibility of public library records). The protection of bookstore and library records might also be viewed as
reflecting the confidential relationship paradigm, in that the relationship b etween such institutions and patrons could
be considered a confidential relationship.
51

793 P.2d 47 9 (Cal. 1990).

52

Id. at ___.

53

Schm erber v. California, 384 U .S. 75 7, 77 0 (1966 ) (hold ing that intrusion into huma n body is
particularly offensive and may only be undertaken upon "a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found");
W inston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence
implicates expectations o f privacy and se curity of such ma gnitude that the intrusion m ay be 'unreasonable' even if
likely to produce evidence of a crime."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1 952) (holding that forcing a defendant
to vomit two capsules of morphine that he had swallowed was a search in violation of his right to due process); see
also Sherry F. Colb , The Q ualitative Dimension of Fourth A men dment Rea sonableness, 98 C OLUM . L. REV. 1642,
164 9-50 (1998) (noting that courts have held that pro bab le cause and warrants are not by themselves sufficient to
justify a surgical search). See also , Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U .S. 250 (1891 )(holding that a court
cannot compe l a plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical examination).
54

R ESTATEMENT (S E C O N D) OF T ORTS § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of ano ther is sub ject to liability to the o ther for invasion of his privacy”).
55

See, Hodgson v. M inn, 497 U.S. 417, 462 (1990)(B lackmun, J., dissenting)(abortion) (“usurps a young
wom an's control over her own b ody ”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 , 915 -16 (1 992 ) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)(abortion); Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, ___ (1990)(right to die); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521
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bodies has also historically been protected by common law causes of action for battery and
negligent failure to obtain informed consent.56
In short, the legal system often conceptualizes privacy in terms of defining physical
locations as either “private” or “public.” While this focus on the location paradigm can be
sensitive to the other privacy paradigms I discuss below, the Supreme Court’s failure in defining
“reasonable expectations of privacy” stems in part from its focus on the potential for sensory
access as the determinant of privacy expectations.

B. The Means of Communication Paradigm

We may protect privacy by ensuring that individual’s ability to communicate with each
other are secure. Because we must communicate confidences, if the means of communication are
not secure, we cannot effectively guard our privacy. The federal and state wiretapping laws
embody this impulse to protect privacy by protecting the means of communication.57 Thus, in
explaining the rationale for the enactment of the first federal wiretapping statute, in 1968, the
Senate Judiciary Committee explained that technological developments in electronic surveillance
had seriously jeopardized the “privacy of communication”: “Every spoken word relating to each
man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an

U.S. 702, ___ (1997)(right to die).
56

D A N B. D OBBS , T HE L AW OF T ORTS § 28, at 54 (battery vindicates an individual’s right “to decide for
herself how her body will be treated by others”); Korman v. M allin, 858 P .2d 1145 , 1149 (Alaska 1993) (quoting
Hondroulis v. Schuhmach er, 553 So.2d 3 98, 411 (La. 198 8)) (“The informed consent doctrine is based on the
principle that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to his or
her own body.”); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.).
57

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508 (codified, ad amended, at 18 U.S.C. §§
251 0-25 22); e.g., 18 P a. Co ns. Stat. § 570 2-57 04; 5 725 . See generally, F IS H M A N & M C K E N N A , supra note 10, at §§
4.41-4.92 (discussing state wiretapping statutes). Location-based privacy rules can partially protect the means of
communication, particularly if the communication involves face-to-face contact. However, technological advances
even erode location-based protections of face- to-face communications. Mo re significantly, much of modern
com munication d oes not take place in person, but rather by means of communication tha t rely upo n chan nels op en to
the general public. M ost ma il goes through a federal instrumentality itself. Teleph onic and electronic
comm unications are transmitted by comm on carriers.
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unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage."58 Indeed, Warren and
Brandeis, in large measure conceived of privacy in terms of safeguarding the confidentiality of
communication.59 Even Richard Posner, who set forth a relatively limited view of privacy in his
controversial Georgia Law Review article, argued for protecting the means of communication
from intrusion.60 While the predominant focus on protecting the means of communication has
been intrusion from non-participants, some have argued that unconstrained recording of
conversations by participants also threatens the privacy of communications.61
Historically, the legal system, either through common law or by legislation, has sought to
protect the privacy of communications and considered third-party breaches of those
communications as privacy invasions.62 More recently, debate has raged with regard to “the

58

S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 (quoted
in Ba rtnicki v. V opp er, 53 2 U .S. 51 4, 54 2-43 (2001). See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 523 , 526 ; id. at 541-42 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting)(By conferring such protection, Congress sought to restore citizens' confidence in telephonic (and
other) communications by reestablishing the integrity of communications over telecommunications devices.).
59

Warren and Brandeis, viewed the essence of the right to privacy as the power to protect the expression of
thoughts, beliefs, and emotions in any form, whether communicated to another or merely written for one’s own
purposes. Non-consensual publication of such thoughts, beliefs and emotions invaded privacy, even if the publisher
had obtained access to those thoughts, beliefs, and emotions by legal means. Warren and Brandeis feared that
technological advances threatened to strip individuals of the ability to keep their beliefs, thoughts, and emotions
private— they compla ined that mec hanica l devices threatened to make good the prediction that “what is whispered in
the closet shall be pro claime d from the house-top s.”
And ind eed, W arren and Brand eis sought not merely to protect the content of “comm unications” to others,
but peripheral informatio n related to the com munication, such as the identity of an individual’s correspondents.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)( “A man writes a letter
to a dozen peop le. No person would be able to publish a list of the letters written.”)
60

Richa rd A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 G A . L. R EV . 393 (1978 ). Admittedly, he justified the
protection because of the “transactions costs” of doing otherwise, namely that communications would become more
formal and less informative even people assumed that others were always monitoring their conversations. Posner, 12
G A . L. R EV . at 401-03.
One could object to Posner’s whole effort, on the grounds that he essentially assumed away a fundamental
element of the privac y problem before beginning his analysis, m erely because it was no t amenable to econ omic
analysis. Id. at 394. (We co uld regard [“privacy” and “prying”] as pure consumption goods, the way turnips and
beer are normally regarded in economic analysis, and we would then speak of a “taste for privacy or for prying. But
this would bring the economic analysis to a grinding halt because tastes are unana lyzable from an eco nom ic
standpoint.)
61

E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 , ___ (1971 )(Douglas, J., dissenting).

62

Even before the American Revolution, the common law made eavesdro pping actionable. Blackstone
reported that the common law protected against eavesdropping, which he defined as “listening under walls or
windows, or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous
-16-

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1

privacy of communication” accomplished by means of Internet transmissions. Encryption has
provided a technological means of protecting the privacy of communications, and in part the
debate has been over whether the government should have any power to breach the
confidentiality of such communications.63 In effect, then, some have argued that given the
characteristics of the Internet, communications over that medium should enjoy a heightened level
of privacy.
More broadly, the means of communications can be conceptualized as including more
than conventional conversations.64 Thus, a person’s documentation of his or her own thoughts
might also warrant protection as a “means of communications,” allowing individuals to freely
express themselves even when they do not seek to communicate with anyone else. For a short
time in the late 1800's, Fifth Amendment doctrine reflected this approach. In Boyd v. United
States,65 the Supreme Court treated the government-compelled production of documents as
analogous to compelling the writer’s oral testimony. The Court opined that “any forcible and

tales. W ILLIAM B L AC K ST O N E, 4 C OMM ENTARIES ON THE L AW S OF E N G LA N D 168 (17 69).
The mail has likewise long been protected from breach. During the colonial period, the mails were subject
to breach by postal clerks. Benjamin Franklin, administrator of the colonial mail system, required clerks to take an
oath that they would not open the mails. Subsequently, Congress enacted several statute protecting the security of
the mail. R OBERT E LLIS S MITH , B E N F RAN KL IN ’S W EB S ITE : P R IV A C Y A N D C U R IO S IT Y F RO M P L YM O U T H R O C K TO T H E
I NTERNET 23-25 , 49, 50, 56-57, 50 -51 (20 00); Ex Parte Jac kson, 96 U.S. 72 7 (1877)(C ourt found a privacy interest
in the contents of letters, but adopted more of a locational analysis in doing so).
Similar contro versy arose with regard to the security o f communication b y telegraph. Sm ith, supra, at 69;
D A V ID J. S EIPP , T HE R IG H T TO P R IV A C Y IN A M E R IC A N H IS T O RY 30 (197 8); Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo . 83, 95 (1880 ).
63

AM ITAI E TZIO NE, T HE L IMIT S OF P RIVA CY 9 1-92 (1999 ); see also A. M ichael Froomkin,
Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1484, 1487
(2000); A. M ichael Froo mkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U. P EN N. L. REV. 709(199 5); Eben Moglen, So Much for Savages: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
Play, 3 N.Y.U . J. LEGIS . & P UB . PO L'Y 51 (1999 ); Maricela Segura, Is Carnivore Devouring Your Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. RE V. 231 (20 02).
64

The actual transfer of information from one person to another can be distinguished from the long-term
retention of the communication. Indeed, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act affords much greater
protection to the act of communication than to the storage of communications. Thus Title I of ECPA, which governs
interception of communications while in progress, provides stronger privacy protection than Title II of ECPA,
which governs access to stored comm unications. Indeed, ECP A even gives greater protection to communications
that the recipient appears to be storing temporarily than those which the recipient stores indefinitely. In particular,
Title II offers more protection for comm unications stored for 180 days or less than it does for tho se stored in exce ss
of 18 0 days.
65

116 U .S. 616 (1886 ).
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compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of a crime” invades the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property, and thus, in a sense, “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other.”66 While the Court has jettisoned Boyd, some forms of self-expression that individuals do
not intend to reveal to others, like diaries, may be considered particularly private.67
The means of communications might also be conceptualized to include individuals’
reading of the works of others. Thus persons may receive another’s thoughts by purchasing their
works from a bookstore or borrowing them from the library. The legal system has been
particularly protective of records of public library borrowing and book purchases.68
The Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile the predominant location paradigm with

66

Id. at 630 (em phasis add ed). W illiam Stun tz has persuasively argued that the C ourt co uld no t maintain
that po sition witho ut undermining the regulatory state. W illiam J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of
Criminal Proc edure, 93 M ICH . L. R EV . 1016, 1017 -18, 1029-34 (19 95).
Currently, the Fourth and Fifth Amendm ents are not considered co-extensive, and regulators have far more
power to subpoena d ocuments than to searches for them. (Previously, in Federal Trade Commission v. American,
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Co urt had suggested that the Fourth Amendme nt limited the governm ent’s
pow er to issue subpoe nas, as well as its power to cond uct searches. Id. at 305-06 .) The con trasting ap proaches to
searches and subpoenas might reflect an assessment based on the means of intrusion involved. Perhaps subpoenas
cause less alarm than searches be cause subp oenas have a passive q uality that searches lack. The citizens whose
papers are subpoenaed identify the relevant papers and produce them. Contrastingly, during searches, law
enforcement officers peruse large quantities of material, much of which may be irrelevant, to identify the material
relevant to the inv estigation. See Okla. Press Pub l'g Co. v. W alling, 32 7 U .S. 18 6, 19 4-96 (1946); PIE RCE E T A L.,
supra note 19, § 8.2, at 408-09 (3d ed . 1999). The difference might also be explained by (or is at least consistent
with) the location mode of analysis. A search would invariably require intrusion into a private location, a subpoena
doe s not.
67

For example, diaries may receive greater protection than other documentary records. See United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he documents at stake here are business records
which implicate a lesser degree of concern for privacy interests than, for example, personal diaries."); Couch v.
United States, 409 U .S. 32 2, 35 0 (1972 ) (M arshall, J., dissenting) ("D iaries and persona l letters that record only their
author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy."). See generally, Senate Select Committee on
Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp . 17, 22 (1 994)(recognizing p recedent accord ing “personal papers such as diaries”
the “greatest respect” and the “broadest of constitutional protections” and noting “the peculiarly sensitive nature of
personal diaries,” yet ordering Senator to turn over diaries pursuant to Senate investigation of sexual harassment
charges). Granted this distinction can also be justified by a subject-matter or location analysis (ordinarily, diaries
would not be voluntarily exposed to another).
68

See, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.2d 1044 (2002). Public library records, which
record the materials borrowed, and thus presumably read, might also be given heightened protection. E.g., Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 11-25 (West 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:73-43.2 (W est 1989); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4509 (McKinney
198 9); see also U lrika Au lt, The F BI's Library Awa reness Program : Is Big Bro ther Rea ding O ver You r Shou lder?,
65 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1532 (1990). T his concern about reco rds doc umenting individual’s reading matter ma y also
explain the privacy concerns raised about the use of Internet “cookies.”
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the means of communications paradigm. The Fourth Amendment’s applicability to wiretapping
has been the seminal question that has forced the Court to confront the conflict between the two.
The court's location-focused analysis lies at the root of its historically inadequate analysis of
wiretapping. If analyzed employing a location-focused perspective, wiretapping may not
constitute a “search or seizure” if the wiretapper merely breaches the telephone company's
property. 69 This approach lay at the root of the Court’s initial decision with regard to
wiretapping, United States v. Olmstead,70 finding that wiretapping did not constitute a “search”
and thus was not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s strictures. While the Olmstead majority
relied on a classic location analysis, Brandeis’s noted dissent focused on wiretapping’s threat to a
means of communication. In particular, Brandeis argued that telephone calls should receive no
less protection than sealed letters, which the Court had already declared protected from breach by
the Fourth Amendment.71 Indeed, he argued that wiretapping was the more egregious privacy
invasion — it revealed the speech of not just one person (as in the case of a sealed letter), but that
of numerous persons who might communicate with the investigative target by telephone.72 To
him, the location of the physical connection to the wires leading to the defendant’s home was
immaterial.73
The Court ultimately revisited the issue forty years later in Katz v. United States. In Katz,

69

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (192 8). Thus, for example, the government does not breach any
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus does not conduct a search or seizure, if it convinces the telephone
company to install a pen register on a subscriber's line. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U .S. 735 (1979 ).
70

277 U .S. 438 (1928 ).

71

Id. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

72

Id.

73
Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Indeed, Brandeis is particularly partial to a means-of-communication
analysis, since he is so intent on treating as private, and thus according protection to, thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions. Thus, for example, in the article he co-authored with Samuel Warren, many of the examples focus on
expressions of thought, sentiments, and emotions, either to oneself or to a select group of others. Samuel D. Warren
& Lo uis D. Bra ndeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890 ) ("The common law secures to each
individual the right of determining ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others"); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , 478 (Brande is, J., dissenting)(The
makers o f our Con stitution ... recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”)
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the government had monitored a conversation the defendant made from a telephone booth, by
placing a recording device on the outside of the booth. Had the Court employed its traditional
location-focused analysis, it would have rejected Katz's Fourth Amendment claim because the
telephone booth from which Katz placed his call was not a protected location under traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis. A law enforcement officer, or anyone else, could view Katz
through the glass of the phone booth, and any person could have attached an item to the side of
the telephone booth. Until Katz, the Court had focused on delineating constitutionally protected
areas.74 Indeed, Katz’ attorney formulated the question before the Court as “whether a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area . . .?”75 (Granted, the Court could have
designated telephone booths as constitutionally protected places because of the nature of the
activity that customarily occurs therein — namely personal telephone conversations that the
speaker expects to remain private.)
But the breakthrough that made Katz a seminal case was the Court's focus on the means
of communication — in particular, whether telephone communications deserved protection,
rather than on the location of the participant engaged in the phone conversation (or the location
of the third-party intruder). As the Court explained: “To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”76
Though the phone booth Katz had used was not itself a constitutionally protected place, Katz
could assert a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his conversation because the
conversation had taken place over the telephone.77 The Court dramatically asserted its extrication

74

LAF AV E E T A L., supra note __, § 3.2(a), at 133; RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN,
PRIV ACY LAW : CASES AND MA TE RIALS 9 4-95 (2d ed. 20 02).
75
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967). Admittedly, the second question focused on whether
the existence of a trespass was of critical Fourth Amendment importance.
76

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)(discussing Katz’s significance).
77

Another example of a dramatically different conclusions the location and means of communications
paradigm can produce involves the law enforcement technique know as the “mail cover.” In a "mail cover," postal
emp loyees record the information o n the outside o f envelo pes m ailed b y a particular patron. A location analysis
would suggest that, at least with resp ect to the postal service, a mail co ver does not bre ach any reaso nable
expectation of privacy: the patron has certainly voluntarily exposed the address of the letter to view. A means of
com munication approach may w ell suggest that such a priva cy interest exists, a person should be ab le to
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of itself from exclusive reliance on the location paradigm in one of the most quoted phrases of
the opinion: the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”78
As we shall see later in this paper, the means of communications paradigm differs from
the subject matter paradigm in ways that have significance for the focus of this paper, the Court’s
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper with regard to the use of information a third-party gained by the
use of an illegal wiretap. In effect, Bartnicki engrafts a subject-matter based definition of privacy
onto the paradigmatic statute that defines privacy in terms of the means of communications. In
particular, the Court holds that participants in a conversation may not ensure that a conversation
remains private, by precluding public disclosure of the contents of the conversation made
possible only by illegal wiretapping, despite the fact that the conversation takes place over the
telephone. The conversation must satisfy a second test focused on the subject matter of the
conversation, namely the conversation must be one that does not relate to a matter of public
importance.
com municate with o thers witho ut third parties system atically identifying each person with whom he c omm unicates.
Indeed, W arren and B randeis themselves expressed exactly such a concern. Warren & B randeis, supra note __, at
___ ( “A man writes a letter to a dozen peop le. No person would be able to publish a list of the letters written.”).
The cou rts seem to take a location ap proach to mail co vers wh en ana lyzing the c onstitutionality of mail
covers. Shirley M . Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Information
Gathering, 127 U. PA . L. REV. 148 3, 1510-11 (1 979) (quoting Un ited States ex rel. Milwau kee S ocial Dem ocra tic
Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921))(Lower courts have rarely perceived that any interest protected by
the fourth amendment is implicated by mail covers. In part, this is due to recurring attacks of Olmsteadism: no
trespass is involved, no search or seizure occurs when the eye registers the impressions from the outside of an
envelope or the hand records the information .... Equally rare is recognition that "the mails [are] almost as much a
part o f free spe ech as the right to use ou r tongues ....") ; see also, Sand y D. H ellums, N ote, Bits and Bytes: The
Carnivo re Initiative an d the Search a nd S eizure of Electron ic Mail, 10 WM. & M ARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 837-39
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's upholding of mail covers as constitutional in United States v. Jacobson, 466
U.S. 109 (1983)) Po stal regulations, ho wever, take a m eans o f communications approach, reco gnizing that “mail
covers” violate a legitimate privacy interest and therefore must be justified by a belief that the mail cover will either
provide evidence of a serious crime or lead to the ap prehension of a fugitive. See 39 C .F.R. § 233 .3 (20 02).
A similar divergence in the paradigms is evident in the pro tections acco rded com munications attributes.
Communications attributes are peripheral information about a communication, such as the original and destination of
the communication and the duration of the communication. The Court found communications attributes unprotected
because subscribers willingly exposed such information to telephone companies. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979). Indeed, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act reflects this kind of locational bias — affording greater
protection to the “co ntents” o f communications that to co mmunicatio ns attributes. Ho wever, the distinc tion co uld
also be exp lained by the relative sensitivity of the two types of informa tion. M oreo ver, ECP A certainly pro tects
both communications attributes and the contents of communications. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 ©)(2).
78

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 . However, so pronounced is the C ourt’s focus on location, that the Court has felt
compelled to repeatedly reiterate this appellation.
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion in Bartnicki is the Court's
comment that the disc jockey (who received a copy of the illegally recorded conversation) could
publish the information derived from the illegal interception of a wire communication because
the statements made in the course of the private call would have been newsworthy had they been
made in a public setting.79 In effect, the majority treated the means of communication, namely a
private phone conversation rather than a public statement, as irrelevant to the speakers' legitimate
expectation of privacy. The Court did so even though the wiretap laws it was addressing
specifically focuses privacy protection on the means of communication (not subject matter
considerations).80
In sum, a second important means of guarding privacy involves protecting the means of
communications, and both the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and various
statutes and regulations have consistently focused on ensuring that communications are not
breached except for substantial cause.

C. The Means of Intrusion Paradigm

Sometimes we can seek to protect privacy by forbidding particular means of intrusion that
are especially destructive of privacy. On the most basic level, the Fourth Amendment, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, embodies a special concern about “general
79

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 ("If the statements abo ut the labor negotiations had been mad e in a public
arena -- during a bargaining session, for exam ple -- they would have b een ne wswo rthy. That would also be true if a
third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they
were alone.").
80

ECP A, and its judicial construction, also at times reflects the influence of two competing paradigms, the
paradigms of location and confidential relationships also have a factor in considering the sanctity of telephone
communication. The judicially-created a domestic exception to the wiretap laws provides an excellent example of
the influence of b oth co mpe ting paradigms. Sim pson v. Simpson, 490 F.2 d 80 3 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974)(one spouse recording another’s conversation from marital home) ; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677,
679 (2d Cir. 1977) (parent monitoring child’s telephone call in their residence); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534
(10th Cir. 1991)(same); Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subco mm. No. 5 o f the House Judiciary
Comm., 90th C ong., 1 st Sess. 901 (196 7)(testimony of Herma n Schwartz) ("N ow, we can see in ce rtain
circum stances where [allowing a person to monitor a call on an extension] makes some sense. I take it nobo dy wants
to make it a crim e for a father to listen in on his teenage dau ghter . . .").
Similarly, under EC PA owne rship o f a location, nam ely the co mpu ter system that stores and transmits
messa ges, gives the em ployer a legal right to monitor its employees’ e-mail.
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searches.”81 A “general search” is an unfocused search, not directed toward discovering any
particular item, conducted to uncover possible criminality. Such searches reveal many irrelevant
matters, even if they also reveal relevant ones.82 The entitlement to privacy captured by the
prohibition on the “general search” focuses on the technique used to intrude, rather than the
location of the intruder, the subject of the intruder’s attention, or the existence of a
communication or confidential relationship (the focuses of the other four privacy paradigms).
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,83 a classic torts case, provides another illustration of the
principle that privacy may be defined in terms of the means of intrusion. The case arose out of
journalists’ attempts to investigate Dietemann, a homeowner who offered clay, mineral and
herbal remedies for various medical maladies. Journalists entered Dietemann’s home under false
pretenses, alleging that they sought treatment from Dietemann at a friend’s recommendation.
While in Dietemann’s home, they used hidden audio and video recording equipment to document
their interaction with Dietemann. Dietemann asserted a common law cause of action for
“intrusion into seclusion” against the journalists. The Court found that the journalists had
wrongfully invaded Dietemann's privacy, but not because the reporters' had entered Dietemann's
home under false pretenses or proven themselves unfaithful confidants (i.e., false friends), who
had willingly disclosed the observations made while in Dietemann’s home. The Court concluded
that members of society must accept such a risk. But the Court distinguished the risk of being
81

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467 (1971); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 1494-1508 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with the University of Michigan Dissertation
Information Service).
82

The precision of dog sniff searches of luggage in uncovering only contraband was one of the reasons the
Supreme Court upheld suc h searc hes against constitutional attack. U .S. v. Jac obson, 466 U .S. 10 9, 12 3-24 (1984).
In this regard, the argument of the Kyllo majority in finding warrantless use of thermal imaging devices
unconstitutional is illuminating. In part, the majority based its determination on a fear that advances in thermal
imaging technology would allow users of such devices to uncover legal activity inside the home (such as when
occupants of the d welling took sho wers), Kyllo, even though, as currently used by law enforcement thermal imaging
devices generally reveal no more than probative evidence of illegal activity — they merely indicate the presence of
lights so intense that they could only be used in growing marijuana.
The minim ization requirements of federal wire tap statutes are also intended to restrict intercep tions to
relevant material. 18 U.S.C. § 2 518 (5); see generally, Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 115 2 (8th Cir. 1992)(finding
indiscriminate monitoring of employee conversation as not in the “ordinary course of business” and thus
impermissible under EC PA ); F IS H M A N & M C K E N N A , supra note __, at §§ ____.
83

449 F.2d 24 5, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
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electronically recorded within one's home from the risk posed by tattling "false friends," and
concluded that members of society should not be expected to assume such a risk.
While the United States Supreme Court has, in applying the Fourth Amendment,
concluded that undercover agent’s use of electronic equipment to record conversations with an
investigative target infringes upon privacy no more than an undercover agent’s repetition of that
conversation unaided by recording devices,84 several state courts have disagreed.85 Thus, even in
the criminal context, some courts have noted that use of electronic equipment raises privacy
questions even when repeating a conversation does not.86
Computerization provides a third example of type of privacy breach that can perhaps best
be defined in terms of the means of intrusion. Our intuitions may well suggest that
computerization of records constitutes an independent intrusion upon privacy. Thus, while
“public” court records may intrude upon privacy by making certain “private matters” accessible,
that privacy invasion is magnified when those court records are made available in computerized
form. With the advent of the computerization of court records, state and federal courts have had

84

White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963). Perhaps
one of the Supreme C ourt’s most serio us failings defining reasonable expectations of privacy is its failure to
recognize that the use of undercover techniques can breach reasonable expectations of privacy. United States v.
W hite, 401 U .S. 74 5 (1971 ) (hold ing that evidenc e obtained through a governm ent informant and the use of a radio
transmitter did not violate the Fourth Amendm ent); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (19 66) (upholding the
validity of evidence obtained through use of a paid government informant); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (holding that evidence obtained by an undercover agent with a concealed radio transmitter was valid and not
obtained b y trespass); see also, Lop ez v. U nited S tates, 37 3 U .S. 42 7 (1963 ); see generally, Slobogin &
Schumacher, supra note 26, at ___ (survey showing that many regard the use of undercover techniques as more
intrusive than techniques that the Court has classified as searches because they breach reasonable expectations of
privacy). Granted, in some instances, the Court has limited the use of undercover techniques. Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 54 9, 554-56 (19 77).
85

State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978); State v. Hayes, 752 A.2d 16 (Vt. 2000); State v. Blow,
602 A.2d 556 (V t. 1991).
86

Note that the United States Supreme Court’s approach treats deception and coercion differently, and, by
doing so, undermines the dominant location paradigm. The entry into a protected area, such as a home, by
deceitfully obtaining the occupant’s consent does not, in the Court’s view, violate any legitimate expectation of
privacy. United States v. Lewis, 385 U .S. 20 6 (1966 ). State courts have d isagree d with this approach, at least with
respect to the intruders using recording or transmitting devices. Some state courts have demanded that law
enforcement officers make some showing justifying their intrusion before undercover op eratives carrying recording
equipment enter residences. See, e.g., Commo nwealth v. Blood, 400 M ass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1 029 (19 87);
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 555 N.E.2d 559 (1990); Commonwealth v. Brion, 539 Pa. 256, 652 A.2d
287 (19 94); Comm onwealth v. Rekasie, 566 Pa. 85, 778 A.2d 624 (200 1).
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to revisit privacy issues. They have considered differentiating between computerized access to
court records and access to physical court records themselves, as well as placing new limits on
the material contained in court records.87 Amatai Etzione has discussed the implications of
computerization of medical records for medical privacy.88 Professor Yochai Benkler has made a
similar point with regard to records of consumer transactions.89
Computerization of records removes the “practical obscurity”90 of records that are
“available” but difficult to acquire and compile. Federal law has recognized this concern, at
least with regard to the use of computer matching. Congress has imposed special restrictions on
federal agencies' use of computer matching.91
The Supreme Court discussed the constitutional significance of the computerization of
government records in Whalen v. Roe.92 Citizens who took prescription drugs challenged New
York’s requirement that physicians report on the pharmaceuticals they had prescribed for patients
and the State’s computerization of those reports,93 asserting that the State had thereby violated
87

In re Committee on Privacy and Court Records (Amended Administrative Order dated Feb . 12, 2004);
Policy Statement of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Concerning Publication of Court Case Information on
the W eb (M ay 2003); Gary Blan kenship, Supreme Court Restricts Online Access to Information, F LA B AR N EWS 1
(De c. 15, 200 3); K ate M arquess, Open Court?: As Courthouses Rush to Put Filing Online, Easy Access to Legal
Do cum ents H as M any Worrying About P rivacy Rig hts, A.B.A.J., Apr. 2002, at 54; see also JUDICIAL
CON FERE NCE COM M. O N CO URT ADM IN. & CA SE M GM T. RE POR T O N PR IVAC Y AN D PU BLIC
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm;
MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & JUSTICE MGMT.
INS T., D EV ELOP ING CCJ/CO SCA G UID ELINE S FO R PUB LIC ACCE SS T O C OU RT RECO RD S: A
NA TION AL P RO JEC T T O A SSIS T S TA TE CO UR TS (2002), available at, http:// www.courtaccess.org/
mod elpolicy/18O ct2002F inalRe port.pdf.
88

AM ITAI E TZIO NE, T HE L IMIT S OF P RIVA CY 1 42-43 (199 9).

89
Yochai B enkler, How (If at All( to Regulate the Internet: Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking
Forw ard, 71 CO LO L. R EV . 1023, __ __ (200 0).
90

U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)

91

Com puter Matching and P rivacy P rotection Act of 19 88, P ub. L. 100 -503 , 102 Stat. 25 07 (cod ified at 5
U.S.C. § 5 52a (o) (2 000 )).
92

429 U .S. 589 (1977 ).

93

The State argued that the new law was no more intrusive than the existing requirement that pharmac ists
keep the sam e inform ation available for insp ection by state o fficials. The trial court rejected the argument,
explaining: “The intrusion here is not only more immediate, its impact is greater. A name on a prescription in the
files of one of many thousands of pharmacists in the state of New York is entirely different from one's name on a
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patients’ Due Process Clause’s right to privacy. While the majority specifically expressed
concern about the privacy implications of “the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks and other massive government files,” it largely found the
problems to be resolved by the stringent state restrictions on access to the computerized records.
Justice Brennan, in a separate concurrence, focused squarely on computerization as peculiarly
invasive practice. He explained:

What is more troubling about this scheme, however, is the central
computer storage of the data thus collected. Obviously, as the State
argues, collection and storage of data by the State that is in itself
legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply because new
technology makes the State's operations more efficient. However,
as the example of the Fourth Amendment shows the Constitution
puts limits not only on the type of information the State may
gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central
storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase
the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to
say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of
some curb on such technology.94
Perhaps the source of at least some commentators’ disagreement with the Supreme
Court’s conception of the expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, is a dispute
over the appropriate paradigms that should be employed to delineate legitimate private interests.
While the Court’s account of privacy focuses largely on location (and perhaps to some extent the
means of communication), many commentators’ accounts of privacy make the means of intrusion
significant as well. For example, Alan Westin views an important aspect of privacy as the right
to anonymity. Jeffrey Rosen (relying upon the work of Erving Goffman and others) focuses on
“civil inattention” as an important aspect of privacy. Neither of these approaches assume that
only location matters in defining legitimate expectations of privacy. Indeed , both argue that one
can have a legitimate expectation of privacy even when one is accessible to others. The Westin

form in Albany which is transferred to computerized records and stored for instant retrieval.” Doe v. Ingraham, 403
F. Supp. 931, 938 (1975).
94

Id. at 606-07.
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and Rosen approaches might provide a different perspective on cases that courts have resolved
(or will probably resolve) by applying a location-based analysis.
For example, reconsider the aerial surveillance cases discussed earlier. The Court has
held that because aircraft operate in public space — namely the airways controlled by the Federal
Aviation Administration (the "FAA") — and because any passenger may freely observe an
enclosed backyard as he travels past it, law enforcement officers may photograph enclosed
backyards (using detail-enlarging enhancements if necessary) or hover over such yards for
extended periods, examining their contents or any activities occurring therein. But we might
well conclude, as Professor Jeffrey Rosen has recently suggested, that an invasion of privacy may
sometimes consist merely of focusing undue attention upon others.95 Such an insight suggests
that the conduct of an airplane passenger or law enforcement officer who happens to observe
incriminating activity as she goes about her business is distinguishable from that of the law
enforcement officer, journalist, or private citizen who hovers over the same yard and
concentrates on the activity occurring therein. The former do not pay undue attention to the yard;
the latter violate the rules of “civil inattention.” However, recognizing the distinction is possible
only if we view privacy as not turning exclusively on physical location, but, in addition,
occasionally turning on the potential means of intrusion.
Alan Westin’s focus on anonymity suggests that there is a privacy intrusion to use of
cameras in public places, with or without the concomitant use of facial recognition technology.96
Westin asserts that one of four important states of privacy is anonymity. Often even when an
individual is in a “public” place and can be observed by others, the individual does not expect to
be “identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known
to those observing him.”97 The knowledge, or even apprehension, that one is under systematic
observation in public places “destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open

95

JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANT ED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
16-18 (200 1) (discussing "civil inattention" — an expectation of a zone of privacy among strangers).
96

Alan F . W estin, Science, P rivacy, a nd Freedom : Issu es and Pro posals for th e 19 70's, 66 CO LU M . L.
R EV . 100 3, 10 06-0 9 (1966 ); A L AN W ES TIN , P R IV A C Y A N D F R EE DO M (1967).
97

Cite needed.
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spaced and public arenas.”98 Such practices rob us of our ability to blend into the crowd and
frustrate a privacy interest Westin identifies.99 The location-based analysis sees such constant
surveillance as raising no privacy issue.100
The Supreme Court has, at times, relied on a means of intrusion analysis to find no
invasion of privacy where one might ordinarily have been found. Wyman v. James deserves
particular note as an example of this proposition.101 In Wyman v. James, the Court confronted a
Fourth Amendment challenge to social service agency caseworkers' inspections of the homes
families receiving financial assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") program. The home, as a location, receives paramount privacy protection, and
citizens generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their dwellings.102 And indeed, the
dissenter emphasized the location paradigm in asserting that the aid recipients’ right to privacy

98

Cite needed. (Westin relates this proposition to Simmel’s phenomology of the stranger.) Posner makes
this same obse rvation , but ascribes it to a cynical d esire to manip ulate others. Posner, supra note ___, at ___.
99

State courts have found such a privacy interest in cases involving “rough shadowing,” cases in which a
person not only constantly follows another in public places, but does so in such a conspicuous manner as to ensure
the targe t’s constant awareness o f the surveillance. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 & n.11, 995 (2d
Cir. 1973) (implied right of action under criminal law of harassment); Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v.
Stevens, 132 S.E .2d 1 19, 1 22-2 3 (G a. Ct. App. 1 963 ) (tort action); Sc hultz v. Frankfo rt Marine A ccide nt & P late
Glass Ins. Co., 139 N.W . 386, 389-90 (W is. 1913) (finding "rough shadowing" to be defamatory); R E S TA T EM E N T
(S E C O N D) OF T ORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977) (tortious intrusion into seclusion may arise from a “course of hounding”
another).
100

Another means of intrusion theory might explain the discomfort of many with face scans or general
surrep titious video surveillance in public stree t. One troubling aspect of such techniques is the asym metry in
positions of the variou s actors involved. T he watched , i.e., citizens using the streets, cannot observe the watcher. If
an actual person is doing the watching, individuals using a public place may at least determine when the watcher has
focused upon them. In addition, the watcher runs the risk that the object of his interest may subject him to the same
treatment. Finally, individuals being watched by an actual person may confront the watcher and seek an explanation
for his conduct; if such a confrontation occurs in a sufficiently public place, the subject of observation might even
successfully enlist the help of bystanders. A concern for symmetry between actors might also provide a partial
explanation of ou r intuition tha t listening to another during a conversa tion with intent to rep eat the conve rsation is
less troubling than reco rding that conversa tion. See Bernard W . Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White Collar Crime,
Undercover Investigations, and Privacy, 11 W M & M A R Y B ILL R IGHTS L. R EV . 151 , 184 (2002). See generally,
Jeremy Friedm an, Prying Eyes in the Sky: V isual Aerial Surveillance of Private Residen ces in Tort, 4 CO LU M . S CI. &
T ECH . L. R EV . 1, ___ & nn. 22-24 (2002-2003)(identifying the privacy invasion that results from aerial surveillance
as the asymmetry of information between observe and subject).
101

400 U.S. 309 (1971).

102

See note ___ supra.
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precluded such inspections without the issuance of a warrant and probable cause.103 The Court
found, nevertheless, that state officials, in making home inspections, had breached no expectation
of privacy of the aid recipients.
Had later doctrinal developments been available to the Court, it might have held that such
visits breached an expectation of privacy, but qualified as non-law-enforcement “special
purpose” searches that state officials could conduct without probable cause or a warrant.104 The
Court also sought to uphold the visiting program on the ground that aid recipients consented to
the search by accepting benefits,105 and some have focused on this aspect of the holding. But the
Court provided a further and more detailed justification for its holding. In doing so it not only
argued that the conditions in the recipient's home became a matter of public concern once she
began receiving aid under the AFDC program (which I will discuss later in considering the
subject-matter paradigm), but also explicitly focused on the means of intrusion used,106
characterizing them as “gentle.”107 The Court noted that social workers had engaged in no
snooping, provided the recipient advanced written notice of the inspection, and used no
deception in conducting the home inspection.108
Similarly, in Whalen v. Roe the means of intrusion proved critical. As noted above, the

103

Id. at 327-38, 332-33, 334-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 338-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas opined: “Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the sanctuary of the home is such--as
marked and defined by the Fourth Amendment. . . . What we do today is to depreciate it.” Id. at ___.
104

The special needs exception allows the go vernm ent to conduct a sea rch witho ut warra nt and probab le
cause when the “spe cial needs” o f a non-law-enforcem ent pro gram outweigh the privacy rights of individuals. See,
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, ___ (2001)(prohibiting hospitals requirement that pregnant women on
public assistance provide urine samples for testing because the program was in conjunction with a law enforcement
initiative, but suggesting that the result would have been different had there been no law enforcement involvement);
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653 (1995).; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S . 868, 87 3 (1987). T he term "sp ecial needs" apparently first
appeared in Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
351(1985). Cite needed.
105

Id. at 317-18 , 321 -22.

106

Id. at 320-21 ("T he me ans em ployed by [the state agency] are significant.").

107

Id. at 319-21.

108

Id.
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case involved a challenged to creation of a centralized computer database containing certain
information about every prescription for a pharmaceutical written in New York State, including
the drug and dosage as well as the name, address, and age of the patient. In part, plaintiffs
challenged the statutory scheme based on a concern about the potential disclosure of the data to
the general public. The court found maintenance of the database permissible in large part
because of the strict controls on the dissemination of the information gathered.109 Thus, the
Court, and the plaintiffs, focused on the means of intrusion, considering collection of information
by itself less intrusive than collection and dissemination of information.110
The Whalen v. Roe Court’s approach is consistent with that of several noted scholars.
Many have suggested that the prospect of dissemination should be considered in judging an
intrusion, and that “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment should include consideration
of the potential dissemination of information. For example, William Stuntz notes that the degree
of intrusion might reasonably be said to differ “depending on whether the information is
subsequently spread.”111 Harold Krent has propounded the thesis that “the reasonableness of a
seizure extends to the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information

109

Cite needed. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, __ _ (3d Cir. 1975 )(distinguishing Laird v. Tatum because material obtained from government surveillance of
disside nt groups was held w ithout lack of safeguard s for further dissem ination a nd in fac t were d isseminated to
others); Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 627 F. Supp . 1044 (N.D . Ill. 1985)(distinguishing Laird v. Tatum
and finding a cause of action for disseminating governmental surveillance information).
110

Granted, because of the subject matter of the information as well as the existence of a confidential
relationship (between patient and doctor), the Court recognized a privacy interest in the information even though the
patient “voluntarily” shared the information with others, such as insurance companies. In the ordinary case, the
sharing of the informatio n with others, even in circumstance in which the p erson has no real choice to do o therwise,
might defeat any assertion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” altogether. Even so, the privacy protective
means of intrusion was sufficient to override the Court’s analysis under the subject-matter and confidential
relationship paradigms. (N ote that the District Court Jud ge had found the pro gram unconstitutional precisely
because it breached a confidential relationship — the doctor-patient relationship, Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931,
936 -37 (1 975 ), and beca use of the sensitive nature of the sub ject matter of the disclosures, id. at 937).
111

W illiam J. Stuntz, Privacy ’s Prob lem an d the La w of Crim inal Pro cedure, 93 M ICH . L. R EV . 1016,
1041-42 (1995). He notes, correctly, that prohibitions of further disclosure do not completely obviate privacy
concerns, and also that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendm ent does not reflect such an approach and
would indeed have to be drastically re-oriented in order to do so.
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even after a lawful seizure,” including the dissemination of information gained from a search.112
Indeed, such an approach might justify the courts’ tendency to treat warrantless law enforcement
intrusions more favorably than media intrusions.113 And indeed, statutes frequently couple
authorization to obtain or compel disclosure of information with an obligation to keep the
information derived from the use of such powers confidential.114
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court has relied upon a means of intrusion analysis rather than a
subject matter analysis in addressing the scope of privacy when privacy is threatened by the
publication of information. The Court has been reluctant to hold that the publication of truthful
information can never give rise to a valid cause of action for invasion of privacy.115 As the Court
explained in Florida Start v. B.J.F., “press freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly rooted in
the traditions and significant concerns of our society.’”116 While the Court has said that
journalists must be free to publish “matters of public importance,” the Court has largely
succeeded in leaving undefined the“matters of public importance” that journalists may publish

112

Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 T EX .
L. R EV . 49, 51-53, 63-92 (1 995). See generally, Seth F. Kreimer, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. P A . L. R EV . 1 (19 91); Andrew Ja y McClurg, Bringing Privacy
Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. R EV . 989, 1041-44
(1995)(relying on the problems of dissemination to distinguish observing a person in a public place and
photographing a person in a public place).
113

Bernard W . Bell, Secrets and Lies: Mews Media and Law Enforcement Use of Deception as an
Investigative Tool, 60 U. P ITT . L. R EV . 745, 791-93 (1999). As between law enforcement and the news media, law
enforcement is much less likely to disseminate information lac king relevance to a criminal prosecution. After all,
journalists’ primary mission is disseminating information to the public. Indeed, the press is often accused of
dissem inating info rmatio n more to titillate than inform . See, id. at 786 n. 180. (I am skeptical about whether this can
serve as a co mpe te or ev en significa nt justification of the d ifference attitudes to ward law enfo rcem ent and med ia
intrusions, because such an a pproach is at least in ten sion with the First A mendme nt. Id. at 793.) The Freedom of
Information Act and its various state analogues may reduce the significance of this distinction because much data,
once collected, can be obtained by the media (or any other member of the general public) by means of a Freedom of
Inform ation A ct request.
114

In the criminal investigation context one of the strongest forms of protection is the Federal Rules
provision regarding the secrecy of grand jury materials. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2); W AYNE R. L A F AVE ET AL.,
C RIM INAL P ROCEDURE § 8.12 (b) (3d ed. 200 0)§ 8.3(f), § 8.5 ("[P ]ublic disclosure o f the investigation may cause
irreparable harm to his reputation even though the investigation eventually reveals no basis for prosecution.").
See also Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3412.
115

116

Id. at 532; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U .S. 469, 491 (197 5).
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 532 (quo ting Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn).
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despite the resultant harm to an individual’s privacy. Rather, the Court has resorted to the means
of intrusion paradigm to craft the constitutional doctrine protecting privacy:117 a matter is
“public” rather than “private” if a journalist obtains the information from a public official,
without engaging in illegal activity to do so. Thus, in several cases the Court established the
principle that the First Amendment protects a journalist’s publication of information the
government has divulged.118 The government may protect various interests, including the interest
in privacy, by ensuring that it does not divulge the information to the journalist.119 One of the
Court’s seminal privacy cases addressing the publication of “private facts,” Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,120 turns upon just such a means of intrusion analysis.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a rape victim sought damages against a tabloid for publishing
her identity, in violation of a Florida statute. The tabloid asserted that the statute contravened the
Free Speech Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court explained that B.J.F. could assert
no privacy claim because, inter alia, the Florida Star had obtained her identity from government
officials. The Court also set forth a subject matter criterion — the matter published must be one
of public significance — and easily concluded that B.J.F.’s identity was such a matter of public
significance. However, the Court prohibited the state from setting aside a particular area as one

117

It is clear that this means of intrusion approach works in conjunction with other approaches, such as
property laws reflecting a locational approach to privacy, and wiretapping laws, reflecting a means of
communication protection of privacy, as well as laws enforcing confidentiality obligations, reflecting a confidential
relations approach to protecting privacy. Thus, for instance, in B.J.F. the Court observed “To the extent sensitive
information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual
acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Da ily Mail princip le [i.e., that the p ress may pub lish any informatio n it
obtains] the publication of any information so acquired.” Id. at 534.
118

Cox Bro adcasting C orp. v. Cohn, 42 0 U .S. 46 9, 49 4-96 (1975)(involving broad casting o f a
rape-murder victim’s identity that the broadcaster had obtained from courthouse records); Oklahoma Publishing Co.
v. Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.S. 308, ___ (1977)(involving publication of the name or photograph of
the 11 -year-old subject of a juvenile p roceeding which repo rters had attended ); Smith v. Daily Ma il Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97, ___ (1979)(involving attempted publication of name of juvenile defender whose identity journalists had
determined by from witnesses, the police, and a local prosecutor); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 596
(1976).
119

Id. at 534-35, 538 (“where the government itself provide s information to the media, it is most
appro priate to assume that the government had, but failed to utilize, far more limited m eans of guard ing against
dissemination than the extreme step of punishing truthful speech.”).
120

491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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unfit for public discussion, and suggested that there may be no category of “private” information
inherently lacking in public importance.121
In dissent, Justice White vigorously disagreed with the majority’s conclusion. He
certainly expressed disagreement with the breadth of the principle that the publication of
information obtained legally from the government could not constitute an invasion of privacy,
arguing that the principle should not apply when the government made the disclosure by mistake
in violation of applicable law.122 However, the difference in the respective paradigms White and
the majority viewed as paramount provides a more cogent explanation of their disagreement.
Unlike the majority, White focused on a subject matter inquiry — if anything can be considered
private, it is one’s victimization at the hands of a sexual assailant. He wondered aloud how and
plaintiff could prevail in on any publication of private facts claim when dissemination of
information about such traumatic victimization could not constitutionally give rise to such a
cause of action.123 White, after starting his opinion by noting that, short of homicide, rape was
the ultimate violation of self, began the last section of his opinion as follows:

At issue in this case is whether there is any information
about people, which—though true—may not be published in the
press. By holding that only "a state interest of the highest order"
permits the State to penalize the publication of truthful
information, and by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to
privacy is not among those state interests of the highest order, the
Court accepts appellant's invitation . . . to obliterate one of the
most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of
the publication of private facts. . . . Even if the Court's opinion
121

In Whalen v. Roe, as well, a m eans o f intrusion a nalysis assumed a major role in the C ourt’s decision to
uphold a regulatory scheme that appeared to breach privacy expectations under another paradigm, namely the
confidential relationship paradigm.
122

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 547. Florida made state officials’ disclosure of such information a
crime. Fla.Stat. § 794.03 (1983 ). B.J.F.’s name had mistakenly been included in a press release placed in a
pressroom at a local courthouse.
123

Even assum ing that the majo rity had re ally relied on a subjec t-matter analysis, W hite’s conclusion is
probably unjustified. The Co urt has defined criminal activity as a matter of public concern, and thus some matters
that do not invo lve crim inal activity m ight be considered sufficiently sensitive to give rise to a pub lication o f private
facts cause of action. For instance, broadcasting the tape of two individuals engaged in love-making could perhaps
giver rise to a privacy ca use of action, even if be ing identified as the victim of a sexual assault would not.
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does not say as much today, such obliteration will follow inevitably
from the Court's conclusion here. If the First Amendment
prohibits wholly private persons (such as B.J.F.) from recovering
for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there
remain any "private facts" which persons may assume will not be
published in the newspapers or broadcast on television.124
Of course, this formulation of the majority’s opinion completely disregarded the majority’s
resolution of the case based upon a completely different paradigm; the majority was quite
explicitly not deciding whether information on certain subject matters were peculiarly
sensitive.125 As we shall see, the Court’s repeated embrace of a means of intrusion analysis in
cases where individuals assert that publication of information has violated their privacy is no
mystery — other courts have done a poor job at consistently defining a sphere of privacy using a
subject matter paradigm.126
In sum, the Court has not fully explored the means of intrusion paradigm as a basis on
which to recognize rights to privacy that do not exist under other paradigms. In the First
Amendment context, however, the Court has used a mode of intrusion analysis in an effort to
avoid the need to define “privacy” in terms of subject matter paradigm (and, as a result, has
largely doomed non-judicial efforts to define privacy in subject matter terms).

D. The Subject Matter Paradigm

Subject matter can be used to distinguish the private from the public. Some information
is considered private because of the sensitivity of the subject matter it involves. We should not
be asked to reveal the information, and publication of the information would seem to be of no

124

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 550.

125

Granted that the subject matter paradigm might never become the issue if the Court rigorously applies
the means of intrusion principles that journalists may publish any information they lawfully obtain, but may not
publish any information obtained by violating the law.
126

See pages __-__ infra.
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legitimate public concern.127 Thus we could consider certain queries or publication of certain
information out of bounds in virtually all contexts. Information about the kind of underwear a
person prefers would fit into such a category.128 We might consider other matters private
depending on the context. For instance, genetic information might be considered private in the
context of decisions by employers or insurers.129 In the context of public discussion, courts have
sought to vindicate the right to privacy using a subject matter paradigm in constructing the
common law tort of publication of “private facts.”130 As we will see, not only is the
determination of whether a fact qualified as “private,” and thus actionable, highly contextual,131
courts rarely find any fact “private,” even those one might ordinarily consider quite intimate.

127

Even Po sner, who argues that individuals primarily wish to keep facts about themselves “private” in
order to m anipulate othe rs, acknowledges that there are some no n-discreditab le matters that pe ople do not want to
reveal. These include a desire not to be seen naked, while performing excretory functions, or during sexual
activities. See, Posner, supra note _ _, at __ ; Haynes v. Alfre d A. K nopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1 222 , 122 9 (7th Cir. 1993 ).
Thus, for examp le, a fede ral court in California co uld rea sonably have held that bro adcasting a tape of Pam ela
And erson and her then-boyfriend B ret M ichaels having sex gave rise to a cause of action for p ublication of p rivate
facts. See M ichaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 27 Med . L. Rev. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1998 )(court held the
tape was one of legitimate public concern because Anderson was famous as a “sex symbol”).
128

The notoriety of the "boxers or brief" question directed to President Clinton during a 1994 appearance
on M TV illustrates the point. See, e.g., Brian Balogh, An Evolving Presidency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, at M1 ;
Ho ward W itt, Powell on MTV Show, Urges Condom Use to Prevent AIDS, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2002. For an
account of Clinton's MT V appearance, see Clinton Gives Revealing Answers to MTV Crowd, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26,
1994, at 3.
129

See note ___ infra.

130

R ESTATEMENT (S E C O N D) OF T ORTS § 65 2D . (One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) wo uld be highly offensive to a reaso nable person, an d (b) is not of legitimate conc ern to the pub lic.”).
On a scholarly level, Erving Goffman seeks in part to define privacy by subject matter, but theorizing that
there are certain “informational preserves,” sets of facts about the individual that the individual expects to control
access to. G OFFMAN , supra note __, at 38-39.
131
See Post, supra note ___, at 980 (discussing Brents v. Morgan). The disclo sures about the intimate
relations between husband and wife found to be matters of public importance in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
might surely have been considered private in some contexts. The fact that the details of the relationship allowed the
author of the offending book to illustrate his thesis regarding a significant social movement, the Great Migration of
African-Americans from the rural South to the urban North, was central to the court’s decision. Similarly in Gaeta v.
New York Daily News, 62 N .Y.2d 34 0, 46 5 N .E.2d 80 2, 47 7 N .Y.S.2d 8 2 (1984 ), intimate facts about the family
relationships appe aring in the news story surely might not have bee n viewe d as “m atters of legitimate public
concern” had not one of the family members provided an excellent illustration of the consequences of the deinstitutionalization o f the mentally ill. Id. at ___. (Granted, the question of whether the newspapers statements were
matters of public concern, was analyzed in conjunction with a defamation claim, not a privacy claim.
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States have also sought to define “private” information, by enacting statutes defining “private”
information in terms of subject matter. The statute found unconstitutional in Florida Star v.
B.J.F. was one effort to do so. Recently, in response to the coverage of the death of stock car
driver Dale Earnhardt, the State of Florida has sought to define autopsy photos as “private,” such
that journalists and others have no right to obtain them.132 The privacy exemption to the
Freedom of Information Act has to a large extent been defined in terms of subject matter.133
Other paradigms might effect our conclusions regarding the “private” or “public” nature
of particular subjects. Our view of confidential relationships might shape our conception of the
type of matters that are of legitimate public interest. For example, Warren and Brandeis, in their
seminal article on the right to privacy, focused on two aspects of privacy. The first was
individuals’ control over the expression of their thoughts, emotions and feelings, which, as we
have seen, fits within the means of communication paradigm. The second concern was men’s
ability to keep the “domestic” life within their household from becoming s subject of public
discussion.134 While Warren and Brandeis were not precise about defining the exact contours of
“domestic life” that were not a fit subject for public discussion, but they did note that it
encompassed, for example, whether a man dined with his spouse.135
Feminists, on the other hand, have attacked this conception of the private, at least to the

132

See Camp us Communications v. Inc. v. Earnhardt, 820 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 200 2)(considering the
constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 406.135); See also Mich. Laws Ann. Chap. 750, § 750.160 a (criminalizing knowing
photographing and public display of a decedent in a human grave).
133

Exemption 6 of the list of exemptions authorizing the government to withhold information sought under
the Fre edo m of A ct, provides: “perso nnel and me dical files and similar flies the disclosure of which would co nstitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 37 0-73 (1976 )(quoting House Repo rt)[S. Rep. No. 813, at 9 (“a balancing of interests between the
protectio n of an ind ividual's p rivate affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's
right to governmental information”); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, at 11 (“by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of
which might harm the individual.”) ; Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, ___ (D .C. Cir. 1974); Wine H obby US A, Inc. V. United States IRS, 502 F.2d 133 , (3rd Cir. 1974). The
Supreme Court has not been as clear. Promise of confidentiality does not mean information is private, Washington
Post Co. V. H HS, 690 F.2d ___, 26 3 (D.C. Cir. 19__); Rob les v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973).
134

W arren & B randeis, supra note ___, at ___.

135

W arren & B randeis, supra note ___, at ___.
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extent it seeks to shield from public scrutiny the interactions between husbands and wives.136
Shortly after Warren and Brandeis penned their influential article, Charlotte Perkins Gilman
noted that privacy in the home was, as a practical matter, more available for men than for
women.137 More recently, Katherine McKinnon has asserted that feminism has had to “explode”
the private, which keeps some men out of other men’s bedrooms (that is, renders the relationship
between spouses immune from scrutiny).138 The relationship between men and women in
families are the public’s business. Exploitation and oppression does not fall outside the public
sphere simply because it takes place within a household or a family. Indeed, a spouse’s
discussion of another’s intimate, but discreditable behavior might be considered unfit discussion
by some, but is viewed by many as important for the public to hear.139
An Alabama Supreme Court case illustrates the divergence between the location and the
subject matter paradigms, and demonstrates that a subject matter analysis may lead to the
recognition of a privacy interest when a location analysis might suggest otherwise. In Daily
Times Democrat v. Graham,140 the Alabama Supreme Court considered a claim that a newspaper

136

Presumably, feminists would not take the same position with regard to public involvement in a pregnant
woma n’s decision in matters regarding her fetus or pa rents’ child-rearing decisions.
137

C HARLOTTE P ERKINS G ILMAN , W O M E N A N D E CONOM ICS 255, 258-60 (1898)(“At present any tendency
to withdraw and live one’s own life on any plane of separa te interest or industry is naturally resented, or at least
regretted, by other members of the family. This affects women mo re than men, because men live very little in the
family and very much in the world.”)
138

C ATHERINE A. M AC K IN N O N , F E M IN IS M U NMO DIFIED : D IS C O U RS E S O N L IF E A N D L AW 92-102 (19 87);
J U D IT H W AGNER D E C EW , I N P URS UIT OF P RIVACY : L AW , E THICS , AND THE R ISE OF T ECHNOLOGY 81-87 (discussing
Mac Kinnon).
139

While Ruby Lee Daniels told her story about her husband’s abusiveness for purposes of a sociological
study of the Great M igration, there is no reason that she could not tell it as a part of explaining her life and
background in ways that might prove helpful to other in a similar condition. Otherwise, Daniels might have been
precluded from d escribing defining mo ments of her o wn life essential to the d evelo pme nt of her own p erson ality.
See Anonson v. D onahue, ___ (T ex. Ct. App. 1993); W instead v. Sweeney, _____ _ (Tex. Ct. App. 19_ _).
A similar argument has arisen with regard to “hostile work environment” employm ent discrimination cases.
Rosen believes that much of the behavior designed to attract or retain the romantic interest of others in the workplace
should be viewed as “private” and left to the discretion o f those involved . R OSEN , supra note 50, at 12-1 8, 23 -24.
McK innon, on the other hand, would presumably see such conduct as highly relevant to a very “public” matter,
women’s employment opportunities in the workplace. C ATHERINE M AC K IN N O N , S EXU AL H ARAS SM ENT O F W O R K IN G
W O M E N 182 (1979).
140

162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964 ).
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has tortiously published a private fact when it published a photograph of a woman whose dress
had been blown upward unexpectedly by an air vent, revealing her undergarments. At the time
the picture was taken, both the woman and the photographer were in a public place — a county
fair.141 A conventional location-based analysis would have suggested that the Daily Times
Democrat could publish the picture.142 Instead, the Court focused on the subject matter of the
picture, which it characterized as involving indecent exposure.143 The Court thus found
actionable the taking and distribution of photographs showing a person's underwear when the
subject neither intentionally exposed her underwear nor consented to the publication of the
photograph.144 While the Court gave precedence to the subject-matter paradigm, that choice was
not necessarily dispositive. The Court might have held that the photograph captured a “matter of
public importance,” as the newspaper attempted to argue by adducing various definitions of
newsworthiness.145
So far, except for the discussion of Daily Times Democrat, I have largely discussed use of
141

Id. at 381.

142

Id. at 383. See, McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)(publication
of photograph showing exposed genitalia of player participating in a high school soccer game does not give rise to a
“publication of private facts” claim because individuals photographed in a public place for a newsworthy article”).
The cou rt acknowledged this bu t rejected it asserting: “T o hold that one who is invo luntarily and instantaneo usly
enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be
part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.” Of course, if the location at issue were viewed as
plaintiff’s body, see note __ supra, perhaps p laintiff could have prevailed even und er a location analysis.
143

Id. at 383. (“W e can see nothing of legitimate news value in the photograph. Certainly it discloses
nothing as to which the public is entitled to be informed.”)(“Not only was this photograph embarrassing to one of
norm al sensib ilities, we think it co uld properly be classified as ob scene, in that 'obscene' means 'offensive to mode sty
or decency.' . . .or expressing to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, or decency forbid to be
expressed.”)
144

Id. at ___. The Court could have focused on the means of intrusion. It might have found tortious either
intentionally photographing a person in such a predicament or showing such a picture to others, but allowed an
observer to describe the event. The permanence of the photograph could have been identified as the core privacy
problem. Such an approach would have protected Graham, the subject of the photograph, had the photographer
merely retained the photograph and shown it to a few friends rather than publishing the photograph in a newspaper.
145

Though it did not do so, the newspaper might have argued that the photograph had captured an unusual
event reminiscent of a popular image of then-widely acclaimed movie star Marilyn Monroe. THE SEVEN YEAR
ITCH (20th Cen tury Fox 1955) (scene in which Marilyn M onro e's dress b lown upward as she stood over an air
vent). Also the court, under an unconventional location analysis, might have considered the relevant location as the
human body, which is generally entitled to privacy protection, see notes __-__ supra, and accompanying text, rather
than as the physical milieu of the interaction, namely a “public” county fair.
-38-

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1

the subject matter paradigm to resolve questions involving the publication of information. The
legal system employs the subject-matter paradigm to constrain the acquisition of information as
well. Subject matter constraints have been imposed upon law enforcement intrusions. The most
central constraint is the underlying Fourth Amendment rule that police may breach expectations
of privacy only if they can show probable cause to believe that the intrusion will reveal evidence
of a crime. The other subject matter constraints on law enforcement tend to be quite modest,
focusing mainly on minimal relevance146 and law enforcement purpose.147 On occasion,
however, the requirement of law enforcement purpose can provide significant protection.148
The legal system structures some privacy protections in terms of subject matter
constraints on employers or insurers, who could otherwise coerce individuals into providing
information. Some statutes make certain matters irrelevant to decision-making and bar
employers or insurers from asking prospective employees and policyholders about certain
matters.149 However, society generally need not address demands for information that involve
146

Thus, subpoenas may only request materials relevant to the criminal investigation. United States v. R.
Enters., 498 U.S. 29 2, 301 (1991) ( "W here ... a subpoena is challenged on relevancy grounds, the motion to qua sh
must be denied unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
ma terials the G ov ernm ent seeks will prod uce informa tio n relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's
investigation."); Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)("The requirement of 'probable cause,
...' applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order for production by the court's determination that
the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are
relevant to the inq uiry.").
147

See note ___ infra. Occasionally, a statute will limit the use o f certain intrusive techniques to
investigations of only certain crimes, ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (listing crimes that can be investigated by use of
electronic interception); see Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. Of the Judiciary, FBI
Undercover Op erations, H.R. D oc 98-26 7, at 83 -84 (1 984 )(reco mmending the same approach with regard to
regulating the use of undercover techniques).
148

E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 61 1 (1999 ); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963 ); Lauro v.
Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding staged "perp walk" unconstitutional in certain circumstances
because it serves no law enfo rcem ent purpose).
149

Subject matter restrictions can be p articularly effective when defined in relation to p articular activities.
For instance, some statutes prohib it consid eration of genetic informatio n or H IV-p ositive status with regard to
emp loyment decisions. So me state courts have also prohib ited mandatory d rug testing unless it is essential to
assessing an employee’s initial or continuing qualifications for the job. Borse v. Pierce Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 19 92)(predicting P ennsylvania co urts’ app lication o f the com mon law tort o f intrusion into
seclusio n)(“It may be granted that there are some areas of an employee’s life in which his employer has no legitimate
interest”); Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W.Va. 1990)(mandatory drug test not based on individualized
suspicion allowable only with respect to those employees whose job “involves public safety or the safety of others”);
Hennesse y v. Coastal Eagle P oint O il Co., 609 A .2d 1 1, 23 (N.J. 199 2)(m andatory d rug testing must be con fined to
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neither coercion (such as "no information, no job" or "no information, no credit") nor
deception.150 Not only can individuals otherwise control their own disclosure of personal
information in response to the information demands of others, but the ability to selectively
provide such information is a necessary element of intimacy. 151 We may define our circle of
friends by our willingness to share private information about ourselves with them. Perhaps it is
for such reasons that the subject matter mode most often addresses dissemination of, rather than
access to, information.
Privacy interests in autonomy are also often defined by subject matter. Thus, the
constitutional right of privacy protects the rights of individuals to make decisions with regard to
certain subjects: procreation, termination of pregnancies, and end of life decisions. Granted,
many of the constitutional protections might be characterized as protecting locations, namely the
human body, or confidential relationships, namely families and the roles families traditionally
fulfill.
Reliance on a subject-matter paradigm may sometimes leads the legal system to reject a
claim of privacy that could successfully be asserted under a competing paradigm. Both Wyman
v. James and Whalen v. Roe illustrate this proposition. Recall that Wyman v. James involved a
constitutional challenge to social workers’ visits to the homes of AFDC recipients. Under a
location paradigm, the aid recipient would unquestionably have possessed a privacy interest of
the highest order, demanding that no entry be effected without either a warrant issued on

jobs that posed a threat to co-workers, the workplace or the public at large). Similarly, some matters may be deemed
irrelevant for purposes of compiling consumer credit histories. KIM LANE SCHEPPE LE, LEGAL SECRETS:
EQ UA LIT Y A ND EFFICIEN CY IN T HE CO MMON LAW 202 -03 (1 988 ); TU RK ING TO N & ALL EN , supra note
108, at 351. And finally, in the criminal context, rape shield laws deem victim’s sexual histories irrelevant in sexual
assault p rosec utions. See, e.g., Fed R. Evid. 41 2; see, Michelle J. Anderson , Fro m C hastity Req uirem ent to
Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 51, 8 6 (2002 )Cites needed.
150

Thus, much of the Federal Trade Co mmission’s efforts to protect privacy on the Internet seeks to ensure
that those who solicit information by way of the Internet comply with the privacy policies that they have adopted. In
other word s, the Comm ission seeks to ensure that those privacy po licies are not decep tive, and brings actions against
companies that violate their privacy policies for engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of
section 5 of the Trade Comm ission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (authorizing the Comm ission to prevent “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce”). [cite cases: Ely Lilly, Microsoft, Guess Jeans].
151

Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YAL E L.J. 475, 484 (1968) (noting that love and friendship require different
levels of disclosure; without the ability to differentiate the level of disclosure of facts about oneself, there can be no
love or respect).
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probable cause or the existence of circumstances establishing an exception to that requirement.
While, as previously noted, the Court’s relied upon a means of intrusion approach in analyzing
James’ expectation of privacy, the Court also invoked the subject matter paradigm as well. The
majority concludes that aid recipients have greatly diminished expectations of privacy in their
homes because the conditions within their homes became matters of public concern once they
begin receiving aid under the AFDC program.152 This subject-matter aspect of the Court's
analysis suggests that aid recipients have no right of privacy in the condition of their homes given
the relevance of those conditions to both their continued eligibility for AFDC aid and an
assessment of the aid's efficacy.153
Similarly, in Whalen v. Roe, a strong norm of confidentiality would ordinarily prevent a
physician from disclosing information relating to a patient’s medical condition. Nevertheless,
the Court did not find any privacy violation in the mandatory disclosure of drug prescriptions
doctors ordered for patients, and indeed the plaintiffs did not really seriously argue that it did.
The subject matter paradigm trumped the confidential relationship (much in the same way
mandatory reporting statutes trump such relationships).154 Patients had no expectation of privacy,
at least vis-a-vis the government, with regard to medical prescriptions, because the narcotics laws
make the ordering of prescriptions a matter of public importance (access to such information is
an essential element of the regulation of both medical practice and pharmaceuticals).
The Supreme Court, as an interpreter of the Constitution, has not used subject matter to
define any realm of privacy, at least insofar as individuals claim that their privacy has been

152

Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 318-19 (“The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as
from state sources, is fulfilling a p ublic trust. The State, wo rking thro ugh its qu alified we lfare age ncy, has
appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that
tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses.”).
153

One com mentator has argued that in the same era that W arren and B randeis were arguing for a right to
privacy that protected dome stic matters and the Sup reme Court beg an taking priva cy seriously (see, In re Boyd), the
poor, immigrants and single mothers were losing their ability to safeguard the privacy of their domestic affairs as a
result of government programs reflecting a view that the welfare of children, the condition of urban habitats, and
public health were matters of public concern. Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man's Home is his Castle?:” Reflections on
the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 W M . & M A R Y J.
W O M E N & L. 17 5, 17 5- 18 3 (2002 ).
154

For a discussion of “duty to report” statutes, see Sandra G uerra Thomp son, The White Collar Police
Force: “D uty to Report” S tatutes in Crim inal Law Theo ry, 11 W M & M A R Y B ILL R IGHTS J OU RN AL 3 (2003 ).
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breached by the publication of information. The Court could have held that information
obtained illegally is tainted, and that no one privy to such tainted information has a First
Amendment right to further dissemination the information. Had it done so, the restrictions the
other privacy paradigms impose on the acquisition of information would protect privacy quite
effectively. For example, states could enforce prohibitions on wiretapping or trespassing by
precluding publication of information gathered as a result illegal intrusions accomplished by such
prohibited means.155 However, the Court has not adopted this approach, because the First
Amendment discourages prohibitions on publication of truthful information regarding matters of
public importance. As a result, then, when publication of information is at issue, the subject
matter paradigm, which recognizes no sphere of privacy, will generally trump other privacy
paradigms effectuated by the laws violated in the process of obtaining the information.
In short, while subject matter constraints have some usefulness in limiting the acquisition
and use of certain information, they have little with regard to the publication of information.
Privacy could be defined in terms of the issues fit for public discussion, but, given the federal and
state courts’ current approaches, the prospect for the establishment of a robust definition of
privacy in that context is not high. The lack of a subject matter definition of the “private” serves
to undermine, though certainly not destroy, the use of other paradigm to protect privacy in terms
of the information publicly disseminated about an individual.

E. The Confidential Relationship Paradigm

For members of society, interaction with others is inevitable and necessary on both a
personal and a commercial level.156 Few have no need for the emotional or spiritual support
provided by other human beings. And we can satisfy our material needs only by interacting with

155

This is essentially the approach that the D.C. Circuit majority took in Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d
463 (D.C . Cir. 19 99), vacated,121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001).
156

There is virtually no fact that we do not expose to someone. See U.S. De p't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm . for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) ( "In an organized society, there are few facts that are
not at one time or another divulge d to another."); e.g., Tracey M aclin, Informants and the Fourth Am endm ent: A
Reconsideration, 74 W ASH . U. L.Q. 573 , 626 -27 & n.291 (1996 ),.
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banks, communications providers, public utilities, credit companies, and supermarkets.157
However, individuals must retain the power to be selective, to establish special relationships with
some that they do not wish to have with others.158 Various theorists characterize our interactions
with others in terms of zones of intimacy.159 A significant aspect of such special relationships,
both personal and commercial, is the provision of information about ourselves. Thus, we need to
engage in differential disclosure — revealing to some that which we withhold from others. We
may disclose certain matters only to others in the same family, religious group, or alcoholics
anonymous group. By safeguarding the means of communications from breach by outsiders, the
legal system may protect information we divulge to such confidants. However, such “means of
communications” protections do not protect us if the confidant can be forced to reveal the
information, decides to reveal the confidence in the absence of compulsion, or forms a special
relationship with us precisely to obtain confidences for disclosure to others.
Privacy protections could secure privacy by precluding people in whom citizens confide
from divulging their confidences. For instance, society might impose upon medical personnel a
duty keep confidential the information they obtain about patients in the course of rendering
care.160 Similarly, banking records could be, and indeed are,161 protected by laws prohibiting bank
officials from divulging account information to government or private individuals in all but
limited circumstances. The scope of such privacy rights against prospective private intruders

157

Suburban Trust Co. V. W aller, 44 Md. 33 5, 34 0, 40 8 A.2 d 75 8, 76 2 (19 79) (“M ode rn society virtually
demands that one maintain a banking account of some sort”).
158

Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Y ALE L.J. 475 (1968)(essential aspect of privacy is ab ility to selectively
revea l ourselves, a right which is essential to intimacy).
159
E RVING G OFFMAN , R E LA T IO N S IN P UBLIC 57-58 (Harper Colophon Books 1972) (1971); Dolores A.
Do nova n, Informers Revisited: Government Surveillance of Domestic Political Organizations and the Fourth and
First A mendm ents, 33 B UFF . L. R EV . 333 , 357 -60(1 984 ); Fried , supra note 151, at 484 (noting that love and
friendship req uire different levels of disclosure; without the ability to differentiate the level o f disclosure of facts
abo ut oneself, there can be no lov e or respect); H.J. M cClo skey, The Political Ideal of Privacy, 21 P H IL . Q. 303,
308 -09 (1 971 ) (noting the need to recognize different leve ls of privacy for different people); W .A. Parent, A New
Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 LA W & P H IL . 305 , 306 -07 (1 983 ); Robert C . Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy : Com munity and Self in the Co mm on La w To rt, 77 CAL. L. R EV . 957, 989 -95 (1989).
160

Doctor-patient privilege, HIPAA.

161

See note ___ infra.
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does not turn on subject matter considerations like “relevance,” which plays a central role in the
subject matter mode of privacy analysis outlined above. Even if a customer's account information
has great relevance to the customer's fitness for a political office he seeks, the bank cannot
divulge the information. Conversely, if a person obtains account information without breaching
the protected bank-customer relationship (by, for example, finding the depositor’s misplaced
checkbook), he does not violate bank secrecy laws by publishing such information.162 Neither,
ordinarily, will the scope of legally enforceable privacy expectations associated with confidential
relationships turn on issues of physical location, the means of intrusion, or the means of
communication.163
Formal evidentiary privileges, such as spousal, attorney-client, priest-penitent, and
doctor-patient privileges, do, of course, protect privacy by precluding the government from
requiring the confidant to divulge the confidence imparted.164 Most formal privileges have an
accompanying professional or ethical obligation precluding the confidant from voluntarily
disclosing the information.165 These privileges and obligations of confidentiality have mostly
been developed at the state level, but the federal courts have acted consistently with such
developments.166

162

A sep arate comm on law cause of action for publication of p rivate facts might lie. Such an action would
probab ly fail if some legitimate reason for public d isclosure exists, and, particularly wh en the d epo sitor is a public
official or public figure, such a legitimate reason can likely be established.
163

Granted a court may consider such issues, but probably in the context of deciding whether the
information imparted from one confidant to another was ever confidential in the first place. In particular, a court may
consider such facto rs in determining whether the confider waived his right to co nfidentiality. The locatio n of a
conversation between priest and penitent might have relevance to the confidentiality of a the communication between
the two. If the statements occurred in a public place within earshot of others, the penitent's statements to the
clergym an wo uld no t qualify as confidential, be cause others were p rivy to it. See generally, JOHN W. STRONG ET
AL., M CCOR MICK ON EV IDE NC E § 74, at 104 (4th ed . 199 2) ("[M ]ost mode rn decisions d o no more than hold
that a privilege will not pro tect communicatio ns made under circumstances in which interception was rea sonably to
be an ticipated."
164

Cite needed.

165

The major one that d oes not, the privilege o f spousal com munications, assume s that ties of affection will
lead to the confident keeping the confider’s trust.
166

Fed. R. Evid. 501 (evidentiary privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience”).
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Though the courts have generally held that individuals have no legitimate expectation,
recognized by the Fourth Amendment, that their confidants will keep their confidences, the
courts have exhibited some reluctance to extend that principle to matters confided in the course
of a confidential relationship. In Weatherford v. Bursey,167 an undercover police operative
attended a meeting between a criminal confederate and his lawyer. Though the government did
not attempt to introduce any statements made at the meeting into evidence, the defendant argued
that the undercover operative’s mere presence at the meeting impermissibly undermined his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.168 The Court, concerned about adopting a prophylactic rule
that might “for all practical purposes” unmask undercover operatives, ultimately found that the
operative’s attendance of the meeting was constitutionally permissible.169 However, the Court
did declare that in such situations the undercover operative must not report his observations
during such attorney-client meeting to any of his law enforcement colleagues.
Courts have held that one spouse does not lose the marital communications privilege
because the other surreptitiously allows a third party to eavesdrop, even though, ordinarily,
spouses lose the privilege if third parties, even eavesdroppers, are privy to the conversation.170 In
State v. Lively,171 the Washington Supreme Court held that a confidential informant could not
attend alcoholics/narcotics anonymous meetings to identify drug addicts who continued selling

167

429 U.S. 549 , 554 -56 (1 977 ).

168

Ordinarily, a law enforcement agent's attendance of a meeting between attorney and client, either
surrep titiously or b y invocation o f the government's coercive p owers, would violate the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel — the ability to speak with co unsel co nfidentially constituting a crucial aspect of that right. See, e.g., Coplon
v. United States, 191 F.2 d 74 9, 75 7-59 (D.C . Cir. 19 51); see also, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306-07
(1966) (assuming Coplon was co rrectly decide d).
169

Id. at ___.

170

See, United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 947-49 (D. Colo. 1982); People v. Dubanowski, 394
N.E .2d 6 05, 6 06-0 7 (Ill. Ap p. Ct. 1 979 ); Hunter v. H unter, 83 A.2 d 40 1, 40 3-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951 ). See
generally, JOHN W. ST RON G ET AL., MCCOR MICK ON E VIDEN CE § 74, at 103-04 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that
the general rule, allowing an eav esdro ppe r to testify rega rding privileged co nversa tions, has rarely been extended to
situations where a party to the co nversa tion makes the eavesdropping possible).
171

921 P.2d 1035 (W ash. 1996).
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illegal drugs.172 Indeed, Lively involves a relationship that, while “confidential” in the sense I use
that term in this paper, is not covered by a formal evidentiary privilege in most jurisdictions.173
Except in the most critical circumstances, courts may well prohibit undercover operatives from
breaching privileged relationships.174
The cost of such privileges and accompanying obligations can be quite high, as I have
noted elsewhere.175 Thus, the number of such privileges is greatly limited.
Outside the realm of evidentiary privileges and their accompanying confidentiality
obligations, the common law generally does not impose confidentiality obligations on those
entrusted with information.176 Despite calls for a more generalized recognition of a common law
cause of action for breach of confidentiality,177 courts in the United States have yet to recognize

172

Id. at 1046, 1048 -49. The case was decided on d ue process grounds rather than on Fourth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 1049.
173

Communications between participants in an alcoholics or narcotics anonymous program are not
privileged in m any jurisd ictions. See T hom as J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential
Com munications A mong A lcoholics Anon ymo us M emb ers, 70 ST . J O H N 'S L. R EV . 693, 700-01 (19 96).
174

Courts have allowed law enforcement officers to infiltrate churches, but the contested cases do not
appear to have involved revelation of protected communications between penitent and cleric. See, e.g., United States
v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696-705 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that undercover agents attending and recording church
meetings did not need a w arrant); see also, Michael F. M cCarthy, No te, Expanded Fo urth Amendment Coverage:
Protection from Government Infiltration of Churches, 3 G EO . I MMIGR . L.J . 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing Operation
Sojourner, in which the INS used an informant to infiltrate a church and obtain evidence regarding alien smuggling
activity).
175

Theatrical Investigations, supra note ___, at 202. First, widely applicable confidentiality obligations
would harm the public interest. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U .S. 182, 193-94 (19 90);
Elkins v. U.S. 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). (Such concerns have recently led the
American Bar Association to amend its model rules of ethics to give attorneys greater discretion to breach
confidentiality when their client's conduct poses the risk of life-threatening injury to others.) Second, such
confidentiality obligations plac e unfair stra ins on the confid ant, who may ha ve co nflicting duties or who may merely
wish to avoid beco ming comp licit in wrongdoing. See, Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (stating that a priest and lawyer could not reveal the confession of a person to a crime for which two other
individuals were being incarcerated).
176

Banks are an exc eption. See, e.g., Suburban Tru st Co. v. W aller, 408 A .2d 75 8, 764 -65 (19 79). T hus,
the common law has long recognized that banks have a duty of confidentiality with respect to customers’ account
information, and the breach of tha t confidence is actionable in dam ages. See, Suburban Trust (discussing
precedence); To urnier v. Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank of Eng., 1 K .B. 461 (192 3).
177

Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43
BU FF. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (1995); G. M ichael Harvey, Comm ent, Con fidentiality: A M easured Respo nse to the F ailure
of Privacy, 140 U. P A. L. R EV . 238 5, 23 95-9 7 (1992 ); Alan B . Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging
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such a legal claim, and appear unlikely to do so.178 Legislatures have been active in this area,
enacting database protection statutes, and there is some judicial movement toward recognizing a
limited common law right to seek redress for breaches of confidentiality.
The standard form that privacy legislation has taken in recent years is the database
protection statute.179 For example, over the last 40 years, Congress has enacted the Privacy Act
of 1974,180 the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,181 the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978,182 the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,183 the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act,184 and Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act.185
Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated privacy regulations under

Tort, 82 COL UM . L. REV. 142 6, 1453-54 (1 982).
178

But see, Corliss v. E.W. W alker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894). Gilles also notes that some breach
of confidence actions have been recognized in California and New York, and decisions in other states have suggested
possible receptiveness. These actions, however, have largely involved fiduciary relationships or commercial
arrangements. Gilles, supra note 200, at 53-58. See generally, DA VID A. ELD ER , PRIVA CY TO RT S §§ 5:-5:3
(2002).
179

Posner, in his well-known article, criticized this trend.

180

Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). The Act not only constraints federal
agencies’ disclosure of individual records, but also pro vides citizens with a right to access and correct such records.
181

Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (codified at __ U.S.C. §§ ___). The Act regulates federally-funded
primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational institutions and restricts their disclosure of students’ educational
records and the financial information provide d by the parents of students.
182

Pub. L. 95-630 , 92 Stat. 369 7 (cod ified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3 401-3422 ). The A ct overturns U.S. v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976), and recognizes a privacy interest in banking records, and accordingly limits compelled
disclosure of banking information to governm ental authorities.
183
Pub . L. 100-61 8, 10 2 Stat. 319 5 (co dified at 18 U .S.C. § § 27 10). The Act imposes confidentiality
obligations on businesses renting video entertainment, precluding them from disclosing certain information.
184

Pub. L. 103-322 , 108 Stat. 2099 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 27 21-25).

185

Pub. L. 106-102 , 113 Stat. 1338 (199 9) (codified at __ U.S.C. §§ ___ ). The Act requires the FTC and
several regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over financial institutions to promulgate regulations insuring that
financial institutions provide consumers with notice of their privacy polices and an opportunity to “opt out” of the
secondary use of information pertaining to them. The Act was prompted by concerns about allowing financial
institutions to engage in multiple services. Experts anticipated that the full-service financial institutions that were
likely to prosper in the more relaxed regulatory environment would increasingly engage in secondary use of
information co llected from customers.
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.186 Database protection statutes govern
the conduct of database custodians, who obtain personal data from individuals in the course of
providing a service or through use of their governmental authority to obtain information by
compulsion.187 Thus, generally these files result from a confidential relationship or the
equivalent, in which an individual is providing access to information that he or she may not
normally make public, often solely to secure a service needed in a complex society such as ours.
The statutes impose a weak confidentiality obligation on the database custodian. The custodian
has no obligation to turn away all inquiries seeking information in the database,188 and many
statutes provide standards that allow, or require, disclosure of confidential information once a
requester makes a particular showing of need for the information.189 Thus, often such
information does not become totally unavailable to courts, as it does when information is
protected by a traditional evidentiary privileges. At the same time, however, the statutes serve to
recognize that the information is private, and in doing so establishes that individuals have a right
to preclude the database custodian from disclosing the information solely at its discretion. Such
statutes embody a legislative rejection of the principle that dominates the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that those who confide in others have no legitimate
expectation that their confidences will be disclosed. In other words, while the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the decision to disclose confidences lies within the
confidant’s discretion, data protection statutes severely limit confidants’ discretion. These data
protection statutes then, control confidants and specify both the uses to which those confidants
can put individuals’ information and the circumstances under which such information can be
disclosed to others.
The Supreme Court has ignored this paradigm when addressing privacy. In perhaps its

186

Cite needed.

187

This does not co ver every database pro tection statute. Fo r instance cred it companies cov ered by the Fair
Credit Report Act do not fit this mold.
188

For example, a video rental store must provide information in response to a subpoena or co urt order,
2710(b)(2)(a) & (b), as does a covered entity under HIPAA, cite needed.
189

Indeed, the standa rd that m ust be m et for disclosure in often quite m inimal.
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most woeful lapse in defining legitimate expectations of privacy in the Fourth Amendment
context, the Court has as a practical matter assumed that any information individuals’ willingly
disclose to one they willingly disclose to all. This failing is the consequence of the Court’s
refusal to recognize any limitation on a person’s ability to disclose to others matters revealed to
him in confidence.
The Court refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy that one in whom a
person confides will not reveal the information to law enforcement officers.190 No only does this
rule cover criminal confederates, but also entities such as banks and public utilities.191 Thus, in
United States v. Miller,192 the Court held that acquisition of banking records did not constitute a
“search,” explaining that such conduct breached no legitimate expectation of privacy. In the
Court's view, a depositor who shared financial information with his bank could have no
legitimate expectation that law enforcement officials would not thereby gain access to the
information. If a person exposes information to at least one other person, he assumes the risk of
exposing that information to law enforcement. Such reasoning provided the basis for the
controversial Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) program proposed by the
Department of Justice. Law enforcement officers would encourage public utility employees to
report suspicious items they observe during the course of their daily work-related routines.193
Indeed, at least on a theoretical level, Supreme Court doctrine is even more troubling. In
cases like United States v. Miller, the Court purports to apply the principle that the police are
entitled to any information available to the general public. The logic of the Court’s holdings in

190

United States v. W hite, 401 U .S. 74 5 (1971 ); Lop ez v. U nited S tates, 37 3 U .S. 42 7, 43 9 (1963 ); Ho ffa
v. United States, 385 U .S. 29 3 (1966 ); Lop ez v. U nited S tates, 37 3 U .S. 42 7 (1963 ).
191

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)(banks); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U .S. 735 (1979 )(telephone

192

425 U .S. 435 (1976 ).

records).

193

U.S. DEP'T OF JU STICE, OP ERAT ION T IPS FACT SHEE T (2002), available at
http://www.policeforum.org/tips.htm. Congress explicitly banned the program when it established the new
Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 880, 116 Stat. 2135,
2245. T he controversy surrounding the program and C ongress' swift reaction perhaps demonstrates the power of the
physical location mode of privacy analysis. At least as the public understood the program, mo st of the reporting
done under the TIP S program would regard p rivate residences, which receives the highest protection under the
traditional location-base d analysis.
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such cases suggests that once an individual provides information to a confidant, no legally
enforceable privacy principle precludes that confidant from revealing that information to any
member of the general public, a journalist, or to the public at large. Theoretically, the Court does
not recognize any variation of a person’s legitimate expectations of privacy based on the identity
of the intruder.194 Accordingly, citizens have no greater expectation of privacy against the police
(operating without a warrant and/or probable cause or the equivalent) than they do against
journalists or any member of the public who happens to take an interest in them.
In practice, the situation is far less grim. While the Court claims to refer to general
expectations of privacy in determining the scope of legitimate expectations of privacy vis-a-vis
law enforcement, it really defines the general expectation of privacy vis-a-vis law enforcement
based on its own balancing of the needs of law enforcement and privacy.195 The Court does not
appear to take seriously any evidence indicating the public's actual judgment about the level of
privacy expectations society should consider reasonable.196 Moreover, the Court's holding that
depositors lacked an expectation of privacy in their banking records did not leave citizens
powerless to guard such records from private snoops. The Court would rarely, if ever, have
occasion to apply its own anemic Fourth Amendment conception of the reasonable expectation of
privacy to claims against private intruders.
A recognition that a confidential relationship may exist despite the absence of an
evidentiary privilege need not require empowering individuals to preclude their confidants from
testifying in all but a few limited circumstances, as is the case when an evidentiary privilege

194

Secrets and Lies, supra note ___, at 762-73.

195

Secrets and Lies, supra note ___, at 773-74. M oreover, different members of the public have different
levels of access to particular personal information. Banks, for example, have privileged access to account
information that other lack. In actuality, then, the Court equates law enforcement’s right to intrude (absent
satisfaction of Fourth Amendment requirements) with that of the most privileged member of the public. In other
word s, law enfo rcem ent receives “m ost favo red nation” status. Id. at 776.
196

See C hristop her Slobo gin & Joseph E . Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy
in Fo urth A mendm ent C ases: An Em pirical Loo k at "Un dersta ndin gs Recognize d an d Permitted by Society, 42
DU KE L .J. 727, 774-75 (199 3). Thus, in finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in opaque
bags for disp osal, the Court disregarded a m unicipal ord inance that made such sno oping illegal. See, California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (explicitly rejecting the approach that expectations of privacy are determined by
ordinance or other local positive law o r custom).
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applies. Rather, the Court need only recognize that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists and
thus merely require law enforcement officials to either make the showing required to obtain a
warrant or advance some regulatory exception to the warrant requirement before allowing
government officials to breach those confidential relationships. Certainly law enforcement
officers should be required to make a showing of either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
before deceptively entering into a confidential relationship to obtain information from a
suspect.197
Sometimes, reliance on the confidential relationship paradigm might defeat a privacy
claim that would otherwise appear sound under another paradigm. The federal wiretapping
statute provides an illustration. As we have seen, Congress declared, by statute, that citizens
possess legitimate expectations of privacy in their telephone conversations, and thus that third
parties may not intercept such conversation (except in unusual circumstances). However, parents
may listen in on their minor children’s telephone conversations by means of an extension
phone.198 Indeed, many courts hold that within the marital home, spouses may listen in on each
other’s phone calls by use of an extension phone.199 In both circumstances, Congress, in drafting
the statute, or the courts, in interpreting it in the context of broader legal norms, have recognized

197

Indeed, Congress essentially took steps in this direction in enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-11 22, 92 Stat. 3641, 369 7-3710 (cod ified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3 401-342 2 (2000 )),
governing confidential banking records, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), governing the use of pen registers and similar
devices used to obtain co mmunications attributes. Of course, in those statutes Congress imp osed a far less
demanding standard than that suggested above.
198

28 U.S.C. § 25 10(5)(a) (establishing the extension phone excep tion the removes extension phones and
similar telepho ne eq uipment from the definition of “electronic, mechanical, or o ther de vice” as that phrase is used to
define the term “intercept” in section 2510(4)); Hearings on Anti-Crime Program Before Sub comm. N o. 5 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 90 th Cong. 98 9 (1967 )(testimo ny of H erma nn Schwartz)(“I take it nobo dy wants to make it
a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage dau ghter . . . [b]ut this bill do es not go to that”); F IS H M A N AN D
M C K E N N A , supra note 10, at § 7:15 (discussing cases involving parental monitoring of child’s telephone
conversations).
199

E.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 80 3 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). In Simpson, even
though the defendant in the case used equipment that precluded him from relying on the extension phone exception,
the court found that the interception was not illegal, explaining that in its view, Congress, in passing the wiretapping
statute intended to “abjure from deciding very intimate questions of family relations,” namely “the extent of privacy
family members may expect within the home vis-a-vis each other.” Id. at ___; contra, United States v. Jones, 542
F.2d 661 (6th C ir. 197 6)(refusing to recognize a “dom estic conflict” exc eption to the w iretap statute). See generally,
F IS H M A N AN D M C K E N N A , supra note 10, at § 7:1 3.
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that in the domestic context there may be no legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone
conversations.200
Confidential relationships play an important role in defining the sphere of autonomous
decision-making protected by the right of privacy as well. Private non-commercial associations
play a critical role in individuals' mental health and enhance their freedom from government
domination.201 Indeed, perhaps much of the due process right of privacy may be explained not so
much as an effort to protect individual decision-making with regard to certain matters, but as an
effort to protect certain autonomous units, most notably families, from state interference.202
The Supreme Court has recognized the critical importance of private associations, even
those that, unlike religious institutions, receive no explicit recognition in the Constitution.
Perhaps most explicitly, the Court has done so in construing the Constitution to include a
guarantee of the “freedom of association.” The Court has observed: “[C]ertain kinds of personal
bonds have played a critical role in the culture and tradition of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the state.”203 In several cases defining the First
Amendment freedom of association, the Court has recognized private associations as valuable
and acknowledged that they merit respect from government.204 Courts have recognized
associational rights even when doing so frustrates attainment of goals of the highest order, such
200

See Post, supra note _ _, at 99 0-92 . Post notes tha t concepts of confidential relationship serve to
constrain the to rt of publicatio n of private facts. Thus while some fac t might be viewe d as p resum ptively “p rivate,”
court’s emp loy the requirement that to be actionable the plaintiff’s private facts must be given publicity to limit
liability when facts are shared among members of a group that have a confidential relationship in the sense I have
used it, such as a religious congregation. Id. at 992 (“the publicity requirement, as defined b y the Re statement,
distinguishes communications which form part of the "'allusive,"' affective, and primary interactions of a traditional
group, like a church, from those which form part of the impersonal interactions of strangers who comprise a public”).
201

See C . Keith Bo one, Priva cy an d Com mu nity, 8 SOC IAL T H E O R Y A N D P RACTICE 1, 6-24 (1983).

202

203

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 93 (1996); ALEXIS DE
TO CQU EVIL LE, DE MO CRA CY IN AM ERICA 513-17 (J.P. M ayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books
1969) (18 35).
204

See, Bd. of Dirs.. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-46 (1987); Rob erts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U .S. 60 9, 61 9 (1984 ); NA ACP v. A labam a, 357 U .S. 44 9, 46 0-61 (1958).
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as ending racial and gender discrimination.205
Moreover, even quite distinct constitutional rights subsumed under the right of privacy
seem to arise out of judicial concerns about state intrusions into family life. Thus, the earliest
privacy cases addressed parents rights to raise their children.206 Even the right to use
contraception recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut was initially grounded in a concern about
government interference in family decision-making. 207 The right to privacy has protected family
relationships in other ways.208 The law in non-constitutional areas reflects similar concerns about
government intrusion into the realm of family life. For example, tort law also reflects a concern
about family as a private enclave, establishing parental immunity that serves to limit judicial
intrusion into parental decision-making.209
In short, the confidential relationship paradigm underlies privileged relationships and

205

See, New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (19__)(rejecting facial attack on
statute prohibiting discrimination by private clubs, but acknowledging that some clubs might be able to establish that
the law as app lied to them b reach ed their freedom o f association). See also , Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (20 00)(Bo y Scouts right to exclude gay scout leaders upheld on free speech grounds).
206

Pierce v. So c’y of Sisters, 280 U .S. 51 0, 53 5 (1925 ) (striking d own Oregon law requiring stud ents to
attend public schools because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Neb raska, 262 U.S. 390 (1 923) (petitioners
right to tea ch the G erma n language, “and the right of parents to engag e him to so instruc t their children,” are within
the liberty protected by the due process clause).
207

Poe v. Ullman, 3 67 U .S. 49 7 (1961 )(Harlan, J., dissenting )(“[i]t is one thing whe n the State exerts its
power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy”); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, ___ (1965) (focus on protecting marital
intimacies and the “sacred p recincts of marital bed rooms”). Indee d, it was not until Eisenstad t v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (19 72), that the Court divorced the constitutional right of privacy protecting the use of contraceptives from the
marital relationship.
208
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). And at
times the protection of the autonomy of the family unit even supercedes that of particular individuals to have
“familial” relations with children. T roxel v. Granville, 53 0 U .S. 57 (2000)(giving p arents right to preclud e child
from seeing grandparents); M ichael H. v. G erald D., 491 U .S. 11 0 (1989 ).
Indeed, in Lawrence v. Texas, — U .S. —, 123 S .Ct. 2472 (2003 ), the Court explained that in Bowers the
majority had demeaned the constitutional challenge to sodomy laws by characterizing it as raising a right to engage
in certain sexual conduct, and re-characterized the issue as one protecting the ability of individuals to define for
themselves interpersonal relationships o f love an d affection. Id. at 2478,
209
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providers very robust protection to communications made in the course of such relationships.
More generally, however, the paradigm has been underappreciated by American courts, and in
the absence of a privileged relationship, duties of confidentiality are rarely recognized either in
tort law or in the context of the Fourth Amendment. However, the political branches of
government have, since the mid-1970's, regularly turned to a confidential relationship paradigm
by enacting statutes to govern disclosure of confidences by various categories of confidants.

F. The Paradigms’ Interrelationships

As the above analysis suggests, the five privacy paradigms, while different, are certainly
not mutually exclusive. Sometimes a court may resolve a case under one paradigm, but the
manner in which it performs its analysis under the paradigm may reflects insights derived from a
competing one. Thus, the Supreme Court’s view of the home as a warranting heightened
protection location under a location analysis, surely reflects its appreciation of the home as a
locus of confidential relationships, namely familial relationships. Moreover, several paradigms
may suggest the same result. The easy privacy cases are those in which all of the privacy
paradigms suggest one result. Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co.210 provides an
extraordinary example of such a circumstance. (In part the case is extraordinary because the
court adverted to each of the five privacy paradigms in analyzing the case.) Desnick involved
journalists’ hidden camera investigation of an eye clinic. The proprietor claimed that the use of
hidden cameras violated his right to privacy. In rejecting the claim, Judge Posner offered the
following explanation:

No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life were
publicized in the present case. There was no eavesdropping on a
private conversation; the testers recorded their own conversations
with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians. There was no violation
of the doctor-patient privilege. There was no theft, or intent to
steal, trade secrets; no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet;
no noisy or distracting demonstrations.
210

44 F.3d 13 45, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995).
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In the passage, Posner touches on virtually all of the paradigms of privacy I have outlined above.
He analyzes the journalists’ actions in terms of the means of communication paradigm, noting
that they engaged in “no eavesdropping on private conversation.” He discusses the means of
intrusion, noting, among other things, that the journalist’s activities involved “no disruption of
decorum.” He also found the subject matter paradigm relevant, noting that the journalists did not
publicize “embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life” and did not seek to steal any trade
secrets. A confidential relationship mode of analysis also suggested no breach of a privacy
interest, as Posner noted “there was no violation of the doctor-patient privilege.” Moreover,
Posner used a location analysis as well, he spent the most time resolving the claim that the
journalists had engaged in a physical trespass, ultimately rejecting the claim because consent,
even under false pretenses, constitutes a defense to a trespass cause of action. In short, the
journalists had not gained any information by non-consensual physical intrusion upon a “private”
location.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the privacy paradigms often suggest conflicting results,
and it is in such cases that the privacy issues are the most difficult to resolve. The next section
will address one such case.

II. Bartnicki v. Vopper: Wiretapping’s Fruits and Clashing Privacy Paradigms

Bartnicki v. Vopper forced the United States Supreme Court to consider whether
recipients of tape recordings containing illegally intercepted conversations can be prohibited
from disclosing the contents of those conversations. In other words, the Court had to determine
whether the Electronic Communication Privacy Act’s prohibition on disclosing or using
information resulting from an illegal wiretap violated the Free Speech Clause. Bartnicki thus
required the Court to resolve a clash between competing privacy paradigms that could potentially
suggest conflicting results. The subject matter paradigm might suggest that the First Amendment
must protect the recipient’s decision to disclose the contents of such a conversation, at least if the
illegally intercepted conversation involved a matter of public concern. By contrast, the means of
communications paradigm, as embodied in ECPA, would suggest that such a conversation must
-55-
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be considered “private,” regardless of the public significance of the substance of the
conversation, and must not be divulged, even by a third party not involved in illegally
intercepting the conversation. The Court ultimately found the subject-matter analysis paramount,
but once again failed to define the scope of “matters of legitimate public concern” with any
precision. I will canvass the Court’s attempts to define the sphere of legitimate public concern,
which, ironically it has addressed most extensively in developing the constitutionally-mandated
“fault” requirements applicable to defamation actions. I will then suggest an alternative approach
which may serve to place some limits on the concept.
Bartnicki arouse out of contentious negotiations between a teachers’ union and a school
board211 that received substantial local media attention.212 During the negotiations Gloria
Bartnicki, the union’s chief negotiator, discussed the status of the negotiations with Anthony F.
Kane, the president of the local union, by cell phone.213 The conversation covered several aspects
of the negotiations, including the timing of a propose strike, difficulties created by public
comment on the negotiations, and the need for a dramatic response to the school board’s
intransigence.214 During the conversation, Kane said:
If they’re not gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to
go to their, their homes . . . To blow off their front porches, we’ll
have to do some work on some of those guys. (PAUSE). Really,
uh, really and truthfully because this is, you know, this is bad news.
(UNDECIPHERABLE).215
Several months later, the parties accepted a non-binding arbitration proposal.
Unfortunately for Kane and Bartnicki, their cell phone call had been intercepted and recorded
surreptitiously, in violation of federal and state wiretapping laws. The unknown interceptor
placed a tape recording of the conversation in the mailbox of Jack Yocum, the head of a local

211

Id. at 518.

212

Id. at 518.

213

214

215

Id.
Id.
Id. at 518-19.
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taxpayer’s organization critical of the union.216 Yocum recognized Kane’s and Bartnicki’s voices
on the tape. Yocum then played the tape for some members of the school board (who apparently
did not publicly discuss the tape). The Board did, however, discuss the tape at the next board
meeting and formally requested that law enforcement authorities conduct a criminal
investigation.217 Subsequently, Yocum delivered the tape recording to local radio commentator
Frederick W. Vopper, another critic of the Union. Vopper broadcast the tape of the BartnickiKane conversation.218
Bartnicki sought damages for Vopper’s disclosure of the contents of the conversation,
invoking the rights of action established by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,219 and
its state counterpart, the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.220 Not only
do the statutes prohibit wiretapping, but to effectuate the prohibition, they impose liability on
recipients of illegally wiretapped conversations, even if the recipients played no role in the
interception of the conversation. In particular, such individuals are subject to liability for
disclosing the contents of an intercepted conversation to others if they knew or should have
known that the information had been obtained in violation of the wiretapping laws.221 Vopper
raised a First Amendment defense to the statutory liability, alleging that the prohibition
unconstitutionally limited his First Amendment rights.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the First Amendment protected Vopper
from liability because the Bartnicki-Kane conversation had involved matters of public concern,

216

Cite needed.

217
Brief for Respondents Frederick W. Vo pper, Keymarket of NEPA, Inc. and Lackazerne, Inc.
(hereinafter “Vopper Resps. Br.”) at 8. Indeed, at least one board member had been informed about the existence of
the tape while in a local tavern even before Yo cum told B oard mem bers. Id. at 7.
218

A second station then broadcast the content of the conversations, followed by the local newspapers
publishing acco unts of the tape’s contents.
219

Two other cases raised similar issues: Boehn er v. M cDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C . Cir. 19 99), vacated,
121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001), and Peavey v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 15 8 (5th Cir. 2000).
220

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725.

221

It also provides for liability for using or endeavoring to use the contents of an illegally intercepted
conversation if the person know s or has reaso n to kno w that the information was ob tained in violation of the se ction.
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and also because both parties to the conversation were “public figures” who should expect public
scrutiny. Justice Stevens noted two interests served by the statutory provisions aimed at
disclosure of illegally-wiretapped conversations. First, such provisions remove the incentive for
parties to illegally intercept communications, by drying up the market for the products of such
illegal activity.222 Second, the provision sought to minimize the harm to victims that would result
from further dissemination of the information obtained in violation of the privacy rights of the
participants in the telephone conversation.223 The first objective, while laudable, was more
appropriately pursued by imposing sufficiently serious sanctions against the eavesdropper.
Indirectly discouraging the eavesdropper by limiting the speech of the citizens who received
information from the eavesdropper, but had otherwise committed no crime, was impermissible.224
The majority found the second rationale for the prohibition against disclosure of the
contents of conversations intercepted by illegal wiretaps more appealing. The Court noted that
permitting unrestrained wiretapping might have a chilling effect on private speech, and that “the
disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy
than the interception itself.”225 The Court said, however, that the concern about aggravating the
harm done by eavesdroppers could not justify precluding non-complicit recipients from
disclosing it when the conversation regarded matters of public concern.226 This forced the Court
to explain its rationale for concluding that the Bartnicki-Kane conversation involved matters of
public concern.
Stevens explained that “the subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public

222
See, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982) (accepting the argument in upholding statutes
outlawing possession of child pornography).
223

121 S. Ct. at 1762.

224

Id. (Bartnicki). Moreover, with regard to the wiretapping statute, the eavesdropper could be punished
because ra rely was the identity of the eavesdro ppe r unknown. Id. at 1763. (B artnicki). In add ition, there was little
reason to believe that prohibiting recipients of the information from disclosing it to others would discourage
eavesdroppe rs from plying their trade. Id. (Bartnicki). In any eve nt, conclude d the C ourt, the “drying up the m arket”
theory rested on mere sp eculation ab out serious harms. Id. at 1763-64. (Bartnicki).
225

Id. at 1764. (B artnicki)

226

Id. at 1764-6 5 (B artnicki)
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concern.”227 He elaborated: “If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a
public arena — during a bargaining session, for example — they would have been newsworthy.
That would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki making the same
statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone together.”228 Stevens invoked Justice
Brennan’s statement in New York Times v. Sullivan that the nation is committed to the
proposition that debate on public issues must be “uninhibited, robust and wide open.” He also
quoted Time, Inc. v. Hill: “[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”229 He concluded that “[t]he
months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming
Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public concern, and that respondents
were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.”230
Justice Breyer, writing a bit more cautiously in a separate concurrence, declared that the
First Amendment protected Vopper because Bartnicki and Kane could assert no legitimate
private interest in conversations concerning criminal activity that posed a threat to public
safety. 231 Breyer, like Stevens, also focused on Bartnicki and Kane’s public stature. They were

227

In doing so, he distinguished the substance of the Bartnicki-Kane conversation from trade secrets and
domestic gossip. Presumably trade secrets fall outside the sphere of matters of legitimate public importance not
because the public lacks a legitimate interest in such matters, but because trade secrets possess economic value that
would be destro yed by unlimited disclosure. Se e gene rally, Po sner, supra note ___, at ___.
228

121 S. Ct. at 1760. As noted abo ve, this treats the fact that the means of communication Bartnicki and
Kane used for their conversa tion was “private” rather than “public” as co mpletely irreleva nt, contrary to the rationale
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Court’s own seminal ruling in U.S . v. Katz.
229
121 S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, which in turn was quoting Thornhill v. State of Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1 940 ). This description, of course, is virtually unbo unded, almost eve rything is of public concern. It is
not clear whether this description limits public concern to government, regulations by government, or the potential
need for government regulation.
230

121 S. Ct. at 1765.

231

121 S.Ct. at 1766, 1767 (Breyer, J., concurring). Moreover, even the passing of the danger by virtue of
the passage of time does not mean that the participants in the conversation have a legitimate interest in the privacy of
their conversation. In addition, Breyer continued, the Court should not require editors to assess the impact of the
passage of time upon expressed criminal intentions, particularly because such assessments would have to made
quickly under deadline p ressure s.
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not private figures in whose professional lives the public lacked any legitimate interest. Rather,
Bartnicki, as chief negotiator, and Kane, as union president, were “limited public figures” who
had voluntarily thrust themselves into a public controversy, namely the contract that was to cover
public school teachers at the local public high school.232 Breyer found critical the confluence of
the minimal legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject of the conversation (criminal threats
to the physical safety of others) and the legitimate public interest in public figures like Bartnicki
and Kane. Emphasizing this confluence, he explained, would allow the Court to establish a
constitutional privilege to publish unlawfully intercepted conversations like that between
Bartnicki and Kane, without creating a “public interest” exception that would engulf the federal
and state wiretapping statutes’ privacy protections.233
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the dissenters, and accorded paramount importance to the
means of communication paradigm — the contents of “private” conversations could not be
divulged merely because they concerned a “public” subject matter (i.e., a matter of legitimate
public interest).234 Toward the end of his dissenting opinion, Rehnquist discussed the conclusion,
reached by both sets of Justices in the majority, that the tape’s content involved a matter of
public concern. Perhaps, he asserted, he could agree with the majority’s assertion that the union
officials’ statements would have been newsworthy had they been made in a public arena, like a
bargaining session. However, Rehnquist argued, the “private” setting in which those statements
were made, a telephone conversation between the two, could not be ignored — Bartnicki and
Kane had no intention of contributing to any public debate in the course of their telephone
conversation. He argued that the Constitution should not protect the broadcast of private
conversation without the consent of the participants, “[e]ven where the communications involve
public figures or concern public matters.” Even in such circumstances personal conversations
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121 S.Ct. at 1768.
121 S.Ct. at 1768.

234

As Rehnq uist noted, Bartnicki did not merely involve a clash between a statute and the Free Speech
Clause. Rather it required the Co urt to resolve a clash between two “free speech” rights, the right to communicate
with others privately, which was vindicated by E CPA, and the right to co ntribute to deb ate on pub lic matters,
invoked by Vop per. The resolution of this clash between “free speech” rights turned on which of the competing
paradigms definitions of “private” and “p ublic” the Justices would co nsider para mou nt.
-60-

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1

meant to remain confidential were private and worthy of protection. “Although public persons
may have foregone the right to live their lives screened from public scrutiny in some areas, it
does not and should not follow that they have abandoned their right to have a private
conversation without fear of having them intercepted..”235
Perhaps the majority correctly concluded that the First Amendment required it to create a
subject-matter-based exception to the liability ECPA imposes upon disclosing information
obtained from another’s breach of a private “means of communications.” However, the realm of
“private” subject matter, in the Free Speech Clause context, has long been quite narrow and illdefined. As a result, the Court will find itself hard pressed to limit the disclosure of the fruits of
illegally wiretapped conversations by third parties.236 After Bartnicki, the definition of “matters
of public concern” remains largely undefined, even in the context of the disclosure of
information derived from illegally-intercepted conversations. Several potential definitions could
be embraced by the Court. Bartnicki did not require the court to define the scope of matters of
legitimate public concern with precision, there were a number of bases on which the Court could
have concluded that the Bartnicki-Kane discussion was of legitimate public concern. The
conversation involved potential criminal activity, the two participants in the conversation were
public figures, and the conversation related directly to a highly public controversy. I will suggest
a “subject matter” test that might be employed to determine when the fruits of illegal wiretaps
may be disclosed. The test might perhaps be relevant in other circumstances.237
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121 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (R ehnquist, J., dissenting).

236

By contrast, note that privacy interests defined in terms of the location, means of communications, and
confidential relationships paradigms are often subordinated based on a subject matter analysis in the criminal
context. Thus, such priva cy interests can b e ove rridden if the intrusion in ne cessary to ob tain evid ence when there is
“probab le cause” to b elieve that the inve stigative target has c omm itted a crime. H owever, the information tha t is
considered “public,” in the sense that it justifies allowing use of information gained from breaching privacy
expectations based o n other para digms, is more limited than in the Fourth A mendment context than in the First
Amendment context.
237

Previously, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)(the “Pentagon Pap ers” case),
the Co urt had held tha t a journalist could no t be enjoined from publishing pu rloined Defense D epartment material.
The case is rightly viewed as a Free Speech Clause icon. However, the decision in the Pentagon Pap ers case should
not be viewed as controlling in a case like Bartnicki. Our attitude towards journalists’ publication of purloined
secrets of private individuals (whether “stolen” from the government or from the private individual) should differ
from our attitude toward journalists’ publication of purloined governm ent secrets.
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A court could adopt one of three major approaches, issue-focused, personality-focused, or
institution-focused, in identifying matters of public importance. The issue-focused approach
seeks to define particular facts or matters as “public” or “private” based on the subject matter to
which they relate. Typically, courts that adopt an issue-focused approach seek to determine
whether the issue in question is one of legitimate public concern.238 Many courts employ such a
test in tort cases alleging publication of private facts. Moreover, such a test has been proposed,
and in at least one jurisdiction is used, in attempting to identify speech that merits the greatest
protection in defamation actions.239
In the publication of private facts context, courts virtually never conclude that published
facts are not matters of legitimate public concern.240 And indeed, some courts have refused to
recognize the cause of action precisely because of the difficulty of identifying “private” facts in
which the public lacks a legitimate interest.241 Similarly, in the defamation context, Justice
Brennan urged his Brethren to adopt an issue-focused approach in seeking to determine when the
heightened protections against defamation liability set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan would
238

R ESTATEMENT (S E C O N D) § 652D (recognizing cause of action for giving publicity to the private life of
another if the matter publicized “is not of legitimate concern to the public”); W arren & B randeis, supra note ___, at
214-16.
239

New Yo rk has taken such an a pproach. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y. 196, 341
N.E .2d 5 69, 3 79 N .Y.S.2d 6 1 (1975 )("where the con tent of the article is arg uably within the sp here o f legitimate
public concern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition," a defamed party may recover
damages only on a showing of gross irresponsibility); Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d
802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 8 2 (1984 ). Other states have taken a similar approach. Gay v. W illiams 486 F. Sup p. 12 (Alaska
1979); California; Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. S. Ct.1999); AAFCO
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 590 (Ind. App. 1975); Diversified
Management v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Col. 1982); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86,
538 P .2d 450 (19 75).
240

Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law — Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LA W & C O N TE M P.
P ROBS . 326, 336 (1966)(surely there is force to the simple contention that whatever is in the news media is by
definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be the final arbiter of newsworthiness. The cases
do not quite go this far, but they go far enough to decimate the tort”).
241

See, e.g., Anderson v. Fisher B roadcasting Cos., 300 Or. 45 2, ___ (1986)(rejecting the tort be cause
“[t]he editorial judgment of what is ‘newsworthy’ is not so readily submitted to the ad hoc review of a jury as [the
lower court] believ ed”). See Diane L. Zim merm an, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Bran deis’s Privac y Tort, 68 COR NE LL L. R EV . 291, 333-34 (1983)(arguing that “gossip” should be considered as
addressing “matters of public concern” because from an anthropological and sociological perspective gossip serves
as a form of “information exchange that teaches about other lifestyles and attitudes, and thus change or reinforce
community values).
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apply. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,242 writing for a three-Justice plurality, he asserted that
the New York Times standard should apply to “all discussions and communications involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous.”243 A majority of the Court rejected that approach, fearing that virtually any
matter in which the media took an interest could be considered one of legitimate public
concern.244 And the courts’ conclusions on the scope of matters of legitimate public importance
appear to bear out the fears of the Justices who rebuffed Justice Brennan’s entreaties.245

242

403 U .S. 29 (1971).

243

Id. at 44. He asserted that focus on plaintiff’s status bore little relationship either to the values protected
by the F irst Amendment or to the nature of our society . . . thus the idea that certain pub lic figures have vo luntarily
exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from
pub lic view is at b est a legal fiction. Id. at 44.
244

Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)(adoption of the Rosenbloom test would occasion the
additional difficulty of forcing state and fede ral judges to decide on an ad ho c basis which pu blications add ress
issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not— to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what
information is relevant to self-government.' . . . [;] [w]e doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience
of judges”); Rosenbloom v. M etrom edia, In c., 403 U .S. at 79 -80 (M arshall, J. dissenting)(criticizing test be cause “all
human events are arguably within the area of public or general concern and noting that the defense of
newsworthiness to the publication of private facts cause of action “raises serious questions whether it has
substantially destroyed the right of privacy as Warren and Brandeis envisioned it); Troman, 62 Ill.2d 196, 340
N.E.2d 292 (“whether a matter is one of public interest . . . depends to some degree on whether the media themselves
have chosen to make it one”); Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 427 Mich. 157, ___, 398 N.W.2d 245, ___ & n.28
observing that “public interest is an elusive term, and may be said to encomp ass any matter repo rted by the press,
and quoted T heodore H . White’s observation about “the power of the press to set the agenda of public discussion”);
Harry Ka lven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law — Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LA W & C O N TE M P. P ROBS . 326,
336 (1966)(surely there is force to the simple contention that whatever is in the news media is by definition
newsw orthy, that the press must in the nature of things be the final arbiter of newswo rthiness. T he cases do not qu ite
go this far, but they go far enough to decimate the tort”).
Ironically, after succeeding in rejecting an issue-focused test and adopting a personality-focused one, some
Justices then suggested that in certain limited circumstances an issue-focused test might be workable after all. Dun
& B radstreet v. G reenm oss B uilders, Inc., 47 2 U .S. 74 9, 75 8-60 (1985) (Po well, J.) (“[s]peech on matters of purely
private concern is less of a First Amendm ent concern”).
245
The scope of matters o f public concern is q uite bro ad. First, many o f the activities in which p rivate
perso ns engage are regulated by the go vernm ent in some m anner and, therefore, may beco me a matter o f public
concern w hen there is a po tential crim e or regulatory violation. Even currently unregulated activity can be subject to
regulation (or subsid ization). Thus, even such activity may qualify as a matter o f public concern, b ecause the public
needs information about such matters to consider whether the current regulatory regime needs expansion,
contraction, or som e other modification. Public servants' participation in gov ernment makes many asp ects of the ir
lives matters of public concern.
Mo reover, though the Free Speech Clause serves to further self-government, the legitimate interests of the
public encompass more than governmental affairs. Surely facts about society and social trends are matters of
legitimate public interest. So are the personal ordeals that individuals must face, particularly when many members of
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A second approach, one that is personality-centered, can be employed to distinguish
newsworthy from non-newsworthy matters. Under such an approach, the question of whether a
matter is public or private depends on the categorization of the individual to whom the
information relates. Though Warren and Brandeis suggested such an approach,246 and some
publication of private facts cases appear to turn on the status of the individual discussed,247 the
courts appear not to have adopted this approach with regard to the cause of action for publication
of private facts. However, the personality focused approach provides the basic mode of analysis
in defamation cases. Thus, under U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, “public officials” and “public
figures” may prevail on a defamation claim only if they establish the defamer’s “actual
malice”;248 others, i.e., private figures, may prevail if they merely establish the defamer’s

society will have to confro nt similar o rdeals. See, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 388 (1967 ); Campbell v. Seabury
Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). For example, the ways in which individuals cope with the HIV infection or
AIDS, including decisions about treatment and lifestyle, have significance for the substantial number of people who
must face those same challenges and who might find comfort in knowing that they are not alone.
Moreover, some very personal matters may become matters of public importance merely because they
illustrate some broader trend. For example, in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993), very
perso nal information rega rding the relationship b etween two o rdinary peo ple, Ruby Lee Daniels and Luther Haynes,
was found a matter of public interest, precluding Haynes from prevailing on his publication of private facts claim.
During their marriage, Haynes had physically and emotionally abused Daniels. In the twenty years following the end
of the marriage, Haynes had remarried and beco me an exemplary person, even becoming a deaco n in his church.
However, Haynes' abuse of Daniels illustrated a larger trend that the offending book's author had sought to describe
— namely the widespread familial dysfunction attendant the migration of five million African-Americans from the
rural South to the Northern cities between 1940 and 1970. See id. at 1232-33. Similarly, in Gaeta v. New York News,
465 N.E.2d ___, 802-06 (N.Y. 1984), a defamation case, information about a couple's relationship and the death of
their son was deemed a matter of public importance. The husband 's transfer from a mental institution to a nursing
hom e illustrated a bro ader trend regarding the effects of a government de-institutio nalizatio n pro gram, and thu s his
life was a m atter of p ublic concern. T he cause of his initial institutionalization (which was falsely ascribed to his
wife's affair with another man and their son's conseq uent suicide) was releva nt to the story. See Gaeta v. N.Y . News,
Inc., 465 N.E.2d 80 2-06 (N.Y . 1984).
246
W arren & B randeis, supra note _ __, at 214 -16 (“there are persons who may reasonably claim as a right,
protection from the noto riety entailed by b eing made the victims of journalistic enterprise . The re are others who, in
varying degrees, have renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation. Matters which men of
the first class m ay justly co ntend, concern themselves alon e, may in those o f the seco nd be the sub ject of legitimate
interest to their fellow citizens.”)
247

See S idis v. F-R Pub lishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 19 40); Virgil v. T ime, Inc ., 527 F.2d 112 2 (9th
Cir. 1975); Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 27 M ed. L. Rptr. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 199 8).
248

New Y ork Times v. Sullivan (“public officials” must establish “actual malice”); Curtis Publishing v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (19 67)(extending New York Times v. Sullivan to “public figure s); Gertz v. Ro bert W elch, Inc .,
418 U.S. 323 (1974)(defining gene ral purpose pub lic figures and limited purpo se public figure s).
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negligence.249 With respect to high public officials and private figures who wield enormous
power or influence, even the most personal details of their lives are considered “public” for
purposes of identifying the appropriate standards of defamation liability. While such a
personality-focus test does treat many matters as “private,” unlike the issue-focused tests applied
in the publication of private facts and defamation contexts, it might make “private” some matters
that really are of public importance.250 More significantly, the test may deem “public” matters
than are quite private. The focus on the “public” status of the person to whom the information
relates may, in effect, preclude public officials and public figures from having any “private”
sphere protected from public scrutiny and “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” public debate.
Thus, wiretapped marital conversations between an elected official and his or her spouse could
be considered a “matter of public concern” by virtue of the public status of one of the parties to
the conversation.251
A third approach for distinguishing “public” and “private” matters might be described as
institution-focused. Because one purpose of the Free Speech Clause is allowing the citizenry to
monitor the operations of government,252 we might consider “public” any matter at issue in a
government proceeding or involving any governmental institution. While the scope of “public”
matters is likely to be quite broad under such an approach, given the pervasiveness of

249

Id. at ___ (Gertz)

250

In part, the Co urt seeks to address this issue by creating the co ncep t of an involuntary pub lic figures.
Ord inarily, a pe rson b ecomes a “public figure” only by seeking to influence the p ublic. H owever, invo luntary public
figures attain “pub lic figure” status despite avoiding pub lic attention, such p erson s are deemed public figures only
because public events or public issues cannot be fully discussed without focusing public attention on them. Gertz,
418 U.S. at ___; Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(only air traffic controller on
duty when commercial jetliner crashed on approach to D ulles airport deemed an involuntary public figure).
251

See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 27 Med. L. Rptr. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1998)(dissemination
videotap e of actress engaging in intercourse is speech involving a matter of public conce rn because the actress is a
sex symbol).
252

Vincent B lasi, The C hecking Va lue in First Am endm ent The ory, 1977 AM . B. F O U N D . R ES . J. 523;
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 H ASTINGS L.J. 631,___-___ (1975); see Secrets and Lies, supra note ___, at
788 & nn. 191 -94.
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government in our lives,253 it would provide more robust limits than those supplied by the issuefocused tests the courts have used in the publication of private facts and defamation contexts.
This third, institution-focused approach has not been used widely, if at all, in publication
of private fact cases. Justice Brennan advocated such an approach in defamation cases in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,254 where a wealthy socialite sued over an inaccurate description of her divorce
proceedings. While the Court used its newly-minted personality-focused test, and found the
plaintiff a private figure,255 Justice Brennan argued that plaintiff should have had to establish
“actual malice.” He argued that citizen review of the operation of the judiciary is critical to
democratic governance, and thus that the statements about the court proceedings were about
“public” matters, not “private” ones.256 Moreover, in cases involving First Amendment
limitations on publication of facts about parties to judicial proceedings, a majority has arguably
taken an institution-focused approach. Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that states cannot
preclude publication of matters related to judicial proceedings.257 I have previously
253

See C harles A . Reich , The New Property, 73 Y ALE L.J. 733 (1964 )(seminal article noting this trend and
recommending recognition of prope rty rights in certain governm ent benefits and licenses); see also, Seth F. Kreimer,
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U.
P A . L. R EV . 1, 3 (1 991 )(“the night watchman state is dead in A merica, if indeed it ever lived . . . [i]n the late
twentieth century, the bureaucrat --- who dispense benefits and licences, who hires and fires, who plans health care
programs or fiscal policy --- has replaced the police officer, judge, or soldier as the icon of government”).
254

424 U .S. 448 (1976 ).

255

Id. at 454-55. However, the Court has arguably taken such an approach with regard to private citizens
who are candidates for office. Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 27 2 (1971 )(extending New York Times v.
Sullivan to candidates for elective office bec ause “it ca n hard ly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application p recisely to the conduc t of cam paigns for po litical office”). Granted such a result
can also be reached by the personality-focused approach set forth in Gertz.
256

For instance, Brennan’s dissent in Firestone focused on exactly this point. Citizen review of the judicial
system is essential to democratic government and, for that reason alone, the breathing room for error that New York
Times v. Sullivan affords should apply anytim e media entities repo rted o n judicial pro ceed ings. Firestone, 424 U.S.
at 473-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). His dissent in Hutchinson v. Proxm ire did not ad dress this issue in part because
he viewed the immunity of a legislator under the Speech and Debate Clause as dispositive. See generally William P.
Marshall & Susa n Gilles, The Suprem e Cou rt, the First Ame ndm ent, and Bad Journ alism, 1994 SU P . C T . R EV . 169,
182 (citing Hutchinson as an example of a case in which the personality-focus of the test for heightened protection
for defamation defendants meant that “many reports on matters essential to an educated citizenry do not receive the
highest level of scrutiny”).
257

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Landmark Commun. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978)(“[t]he operation of the Virginia [Judicial Inquiry and Review] Comm ission, no less than the operation of the
judicial system itself, is a matter of public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the newsmedia”); Nebraska
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characterized the approach as a means of intrusion approach,258 but it could also be characterized
as a subject-matter approach that makes the “public” nature of a fact turn on whether the fact is
discussed in the context of government action.259
Bartnicki requires that the courts distinguish “public” from “private” matters, and none of
the approaches outlined above is satisfactory. In the context of delineating the First Amendment
protections for third-party disclosure of the fruits of illegally wiretapping, courts should protect
the use or disclosure of such material only if the intercepted conversation involves the use of
power. Such an approach will allow third parties to disclose particularly important information,
but at the same time will impose important constraints upon the further disclosure of illegally
wiretapped information, information obtained by violation of the norms of privacy established by
a statute embodying the means of communication paradigm. Unlike, the issue-focused tests as
applied by the courts, surely there will be many conversations that, while they may involve
matters of legitimate public interest, will not involve the use of power that the citizenry has a
legitimate interest in monitoring. Unlike the personality-focused test, it allows public officials
and public figures to have some conversations that, if illegally wiretapped, may still not be
disclosed. Certainly many of the private conversations in which public officials and public
figures engage do not involve the use of power over others. The proposed test is somewhat
similar to the institution-focused approach, except that not everyone who has some interaction
with the government will have their interaction with the government subjected to public scrutiny.
Certainly the exercise of political power would qualify as the exercise of a type of power
over a substantial segment of the public. Thus, conversations regarding the exercise of political
power would qualify as those that concern a public matter such that third parties who receive
information regarding the conversation would have a First Amendment right to disclose that

Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976); B.J.F. v. Florida Star, (the article generally . . . involved a matter of
paramou nt pub lic impo rt: the commission, and investigation, o f a violent crime w hich had been rep orted to
authorities”), see generally, Oklahom a Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Smith v. Daily M ail
Pub lishing Co., 44 3 U .S. 97 (1979). (Similar argum ents are mad e in the co ntext of the right of access to trials.)
258

See page ___ supra.

259

See note 118 supra. Indeed, the rationale for the Freedom of Information Ac t is that the citizenry has a
right to know of government activities. Cite needed.
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information. The exercise of economic power should also qualify as a “public” matter, such that
the contents of illegally-recorded private conversations could be disclosed by those not complicit
in the initial interception. Thus conversations about the manner in which a corporate enterprise
will make decisions would fit within such as rule. However, in some circumstances, the exercise
of power over a substantial segment of the public should not be sufficient to give third-parties a
First Amendment right to disclose the contents of an illegally-wiretapped conversation. Thus
while a religious leader may exercise substantial authority over members of their congregations,
the exercise of such power should not give rise to a right to disclose the contents of an illegallywiretapped conversation between religious leaders or between religious leaders and members of
their congregations. The autonomy of religious groups is so essential, that religious organization
should retain some immunity from public scrutiny, even if at times this allows religious leaders
to abuse their authority.
Bartnicki can serve to illustrate the approach suggested above. The conversation in
Bartnicki did involve the exercise of power over a substantial segment of the public, and thus,
arguably, if the Court will allow a “subject matter” inquiry to trump a privacy interest defined in
terms of the means of intrusion, the case was an appropriate one in which to conclude that the
conversation was in some sense a “public conversation.” Bartnicki and Kane, the participants in
the illegally-intercepted conversation, could and did wield substantial power with regard to a
major public contract in the school district. The public employees union that the two
represented had been granted a special power by law, indeed a monopoly power,260 to represent
those employees in a matter that is of great public interest, namely, the terms and conditions of
employment for the teachers in that school district. Moreover, the particular discussion that was
intercepted was one in which Bartnicki and Kane were discussing strategies for using their
resources to reach a favorable outcome in the contract negotiations with school authorities. As
the respondents noted in Bartnicki, the case involved assertion of a privacy interest by

260

43 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43 § 21 1.7 (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representative of all em ployees in such unit for the purposes of co llective bargaining in resp ect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment”).
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“participants in a telephone conversation about the public’s business.”261 262

CONCLUSION
The legal system’s treatment of privacy can best be understood by recognizing that
privacy has not been developed as a unitary, comprehensive concept, but instead in terms of
several paradigms — the paradigms of location, means of communication, means of intrusion,
subject matter, and confidential relationships. The legal system relies upon different paradigm at
different times. While the paradigms sometimes suggest the same result, often they do not.
Thus, as we have seen, the selection of the paradigm is a critical step in resolving privacy claims.
Much of the judicial development of privacy law can justly be criticized for over-emphasizing
the paradigm of location, and under-emphasizing competing paradigms, such as the confidential
relationship and means of intrusion paradigms. Judicial doctrine can also be criticized for
adopting a particularly privacy-destroying version of the location paradigm.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court has made a basic judgment to privilege the subject
matter paradigm used in the First Amendment context in addressing the publication of
information over the competing paradigms, in particular the means of communications paradigm,

261

See Vopper Resps. Br. at 32 (“this case involves the assertion of a privacy interest, not by the victim of
a violent sexual assault, but by participants in a telephone conversation about the public’s business; [t]he fact that
they hoped, or even expected, that their discussion would remain confidential does not constitute an ‘interest of the
highest order’”).
262

Boehn er v. M cDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), provides a second illustration. In that case a
mem ber o f the Republican leadersh ip of the Ho use of Representatives, Jo hn A. B oehner, spoke by cell phone with
three other members of the Republican leadership regarding disposition of ethics complaints against then-Speaker
Newt Gingrich that were the n befo re the H ouse Committee on S tanda rds of Official C onduct. T he pa rticipants
discussed stra tegy regarding an expected E thics Subco mmittee announc ement of G ingrich's agreem ent to accep t a
reprimand and to pay a fine in exchange for the committee's promise not to hold a hearing. The phone call was
illegally intercepted by two private citizens, who forwarded the tape to James A McD ermott, the ranking Democrat
on the Ho use Ethics Co mmittee. M cDermo tt then delivered copies of the tapes to the New Y ork times, the Atlanta
Constitution Journal, and Roll Call. After acco unts of the conversation were published, B oehner sued M cDermo tt
for disclosing the contents of the illegally wiretapped information when he knew or should have known that the
conversation had been interc epted illegally. M cDermo tt asserted that imposition of such liability would deprive him
of his First Amendment rights. The D.C. Circuit resolved the case by upholding the cause of action, thus giving
precedence to the ECP A’s means of communication paradigm rather than the subject paradigm. However, if the
subject matter paradigm is paramount, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bartnicki, surely Boehn er v. M cDermott is
a case in which the co nversation shou ld be co nsidered a matter of legitimate public interest. The prop osed test
would pro duce that result, the conversa tion clea rly involved the exercise of power, politica l power, over othe rs.
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that protect privacy by placing legal constraints on the acquisition of information. Ultimately,
however, the subject matter paradigm does not provide very robust privacy protections, and the
Court has not seriously sought to define the realms of “public” and “private” in the context of the
publication of information. In the context of the fruits of illegally wiretapped conversation, a
subject matter test that focuses on whether the intercepted conversation involves the use of power
over a substantial segment of the public provides a subject matter test that is protective of First
Amendment interests while providing robust privacy protections.
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